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VOLUME XII SUMMER, 1958 NUMBER 3
TEXAS PARTNERSHIP LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY -
WHY TEXAS SHOULD ADOPT THE UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT
by
Byron D. Sher* and Alan R. Brombergt
N 1955, Texas took two significant forward steps in the long-
needed modernization of the law governing business associations
in this state. In that year, the Legislature enacted the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act' and the new Texas Business Corporation
Act." In the field of general partnership law, however, Texas still
lags behind most states, and its attorneys and businessmen are
plagued by an uncertain and, in a number of respects, deficient
body of law, which could be vastly improved by the adoption
of the Uniform Partnership Act.'
At the time of its approval of the act in 1914, The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws advanced
as reasons in support of its recommendation for adoption of the
act the lack of uniformity of the law among the states and its
desirability because of the increasing number of partnerships car-
rying on business in more than one state and having as members
residents of different states; the uncertainty in the existing law
of partnerships due to conflict of decisions of different states and
lack of consistency in legal theory; and the scarcity or absence
of authority on important matters in the conduct and winding
up of partnership affairs." These reasons are, if anything, even
*B.&., Washington University; LL.B., Harvard University; former Assistant Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University; Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University.
t A.B., Harvard University; LL.B., Yale University; Associate Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University. Professor Bromberg expresses his appreciation to Eugene L. Smith
for assistance in the preparation of his part of this Article.
' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a (1956 Supp.).
'Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. (1956).
"7 Uniform Laws Ann. §§ 1-45 (1949). The Uniform Partnership Act is set out in
full in the Appendix, infra p. 319; it will be referred to as the "act" throughout this
Article. The Commissioners' Notes appear after each section in Uniform Partnership Act
Ann.; they will be cited hereafter as "Commissioners' Note" with a reference to the ap-
propriate section.
"Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Partnership Act Ann. I (1949).
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more appealing today.5 But wholly apart from these considerations,
there are a number of positive defects in the Texas law which,
together with the areas of uncertainty, it is the purpose of this
Article to point out in an effort to enlist support for the enactment
of the Uniform Partnership Act in Texas.
I. THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP
The Texas courts, like those of every other state, have frequently
struggled with the question of whether or not a particular business
association is a partnership. The question most often arises when
a creditor seeks to collect a claim from one alleged to be a partner of
the person with whom the creditor dealt in extending credit and
who is thus liable for the debt.'
In some of the early cases there were indications that the Texas
courts might follow the old English test of the existence of a
partnership, long since repudiated," that the mere participation in
profits of a business makes the participant a partner." The basis of
the "profit-sharing" or "net profit" test is that fairness requires
that one who shares in the profits of a business should be liable
for the obligations incurred in carrying on that business. The
test is defective, however, in that it fails to recognize that it is
very common in business arrangements for a percentage of the
profits of a business to be used as a convenient device for measuring
such things as interest on a loan or rent, and that the lender or
the landlord is not participating in the profits as an owner of
a The act has been adopted by thirty-five states, Alaska and Guam. Table Of States
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, Uniform Partnership Act Ann. 6 (1956 Supp.). -That the
act has proved itself and is as appealing today as when it was enacted is attested to by the
fact that it has been adopted in seven states since 1950. Ibid. Thus, by adopting the act,
Texas could achieve uniformity of partnership law with three fourths of the states; more-
over, it would not be acting blindly because of the many cases in those states interpreting
various sections of the act, which become a part of any system of uniform laws.
'Crane, Partnership 5 4 (2d ed. 1952). However, the question of whether there is a
partnership is by no means limited to the liability-for-debts situation. See, e.g., Millers' In-
demnity Underwriters v. Patten, 238 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), aff'd, 250 S.W.
154 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) (question of whether man was a partner, and thus not an
employee under Workmen's Compensation law).
'Cox v. Hickman, 8 H.L.C. 268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
* Cothran v. Marmaduke & Brown, 60 Tex. 370 (1883) (holding that one who is to
receive a share of the profits of the business as consideration for a loan is a partner);
Steger v. Greer, 228 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error dism.; Avery v. Llano Cotton
Seed Oil Mill Ass'n, 196 S.W. 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.; Fink v. Brown, 183
S.W. 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), rev'd as to alleged partner, 215 S.W. 846 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1919); Fouke v. Brengle, SI S.W. 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899); Dilley v. Abright, 48
S.W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898). It has been said, however, that the English net profits
rule has never been adopted in Texas, although the language of some of the early cases led
to some confusion. Gardner v. Weaner, 55 S.W.2d 1104, 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
error ref.
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the business, thus making it unfair to hold him accountable for the
obligations of the business. The Texas courts, like those of most
jurisdictions, eventually recognized this defect, and they have
clearly rejected participation in profits as an arbitrary test of the
existence of a partnership;' however, they have not found it so
easy to develop a definitive test of partnership. In fact, some courts
have said that it is impossible to formulate such a definition or
test." On the other hand, after dealing with a great many cases
involving the question of the existence of a partnership, the Texas
courts seem to have developed an approach to the problem that
works out fairly well in most cases. They have taken the position,
adopted by most courts, that while participation in profits is
"presumptive" evidence of the existence of a partnership, it is
not conclusive and can be overcome by a showing of the absence
of other partnership attributes." Moreover, they have succeeded
in formulating a general test which at least serves as a starting
point for the determination of whether the relation exists, as follows:
"a community of interests, the common enterprise, its operation
for the joint account, and a right in each owner to share as a
nrincipal in its profits as such."'" While this formulation does not
furnish the courts with a precise and completely objective yardstick,
since several of the terms are elastic and need definition themselves,
it does establish the general principle that the alleged partner's
interest in the business and in the profits must be that of an owner."
'Fink v. Brown, 215 S.W. 846 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919), reversing 183 S.W. 46 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916) as to liability of alleged partner; Gardner v. Wesner. 55 S.W.2d 1104
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. The Texas courts have recognized that profit sharing
may be used by businesses in non-partnership arrangements; and there are decisions holding
that there was no partnershin where a share of the profits was used as a measure of rent,
Fink v. Brown, supra; interest, Eddingston v. Acorn, 259 S.W. 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
error dism.; compensation for services, Goode v. McCartney, 10 Tex. 193 (1853); com-
mission for agent or broker, Buzard v. Bank, 67 Tex. 83, 2 S.W. 54 (1886).
'°Moore v. Scott, 16 S.W.2d 1100, 1106-07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error dism.;
Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Patten, 238 S.W. 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922),
aff'd, 250 S.W. 154 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
"Fink v. Brown, 215 S.W. 846 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Eddingston v. Acorn, 259
S.W. 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error dism.; Southern Surety Co. v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n, 2 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.; see also Davis v. Gilmore, 244
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
Is This test seems to have been first formulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Free-
man v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 105 Tex. 560, 153 S.W. 122 (1913). It has been fre-
quently cited by the courts as the test of the existence of a partnership in Texas. See,
e.g., Fink v. Brown, 215 S.W. 846, 849 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Ogus, Rabinovich &
Ogus v. Foley Bros. Dry Goods Co., 252 S.W. 1048, 1051 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923);
Gardner v. Wesner, 55 S.W.2d 1104, 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
"See Strawn Nat'l Bank v. Marchbanks, 74 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
error ref., in which it is stated that the Texas courts have given meaning to the phrase
"interest in profits as profits," Iriticized by some writers as meaningless, to the effect that
the profit sharer is a partner only if his interest in the profits is that of a part owner.
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The act's definition of a partnership, "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,
14
does not do away with this uncertainty, since reasonable men may
differ as to whether the facts of a particular case establish co-
ownership. In fact, the final draftsman of the act conceded that
it is impossible for any statutory statement of the law to eliminate
the uncertainties inherent in the question of whether or not a
particular association is a partnership, which, unlike other kinds
of business associations, is not formed by the happening of an
event or the compliance with certain formal requirements specified
in a statute as necessary to its formation. Section 7 of the act
does afford some help by laying down a series of rules to assist
in the determination of whether a partnership exists, including the
principle now accepted in Texas that profit sharing is prima facie
evidence that the profit sharer is a partner in the business but
that no such inference shall be drawn if the profits are received
in payment of such things as a debt, wages, or interest. "In spite
of these rules, however, it will always be possible to give a number
of real or supposititious cases in which men will differ as to whether
the facts show co-ownership of a given business."'"
On the other hand, in at least one respect the act may reduce the
existence-of-a-partnership uncertainty, and that is in emphasizing
that "co-ownership" as used in section 6 involves "the power of
ultimate control" over the business. While the Texas courts
"5 6.
'5 See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 Yale L.J. 617 (1915), where the author
states at 622:
On the other hand, an infinite number of combinations may result in co-ownership
of a business. Partnership is the residuum, including all forms of co-ownership, of a
business except those business associations organized under a specific statute.
If a partnership act were to declare that a partnership was not formed until the
formal requirements of the statute were complied with, it would not be a statute reg-
ulating common law partnerships, but one abolishing common law partnership and
establishing a new form of statutory association. If no formal act can be specifically
designated as a necessary prerequisite to the formation of a common law partnership,
it follows that it is not always easy to determine whether the acts proved indicate co-
ownership of a business. Ownership, whether the ownership of a business or the sep-
arate ownership of personal or real property, involves the idea of control; but the
degree of control necessary is incapable of exact definition. Neither is it possible to
catalogue all the possible combinations of fact, which, when found to exist, will con-
clusively prove ownership.
As to the difficulty of defining a partnership, see Crane, Partnership S 5 (2d ed. 1952);
Mechem, Partnership § 1 (2d ed. 1920); Lindley, Partnership 1-5 (2d Am. ed. 1818)
(quoting numerous definitions).
1 Lewis, supra note 15, at 622.
"7 Commissioners' Note to § 6; see also statement of Professor Lewis quoted in note 15
supra.
Of course, the fact that the parties agree that the management of the everyday affairs
of the business shall be concentrated in less than all of the parties does not automatically
mean there can be no partnership, Crane, Partnership § 14 (2d ed. 1952), since the "power
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have sometimes stressed the factor of control over the business
as evidence of the existence of a partnership,"8 in other cases they
have ignored this factor which, if taken into account, may very
well have produced a different result.'
Moreover, adoption of the act would eliminate the vague "part-
ners as to third persons" doctrine that has found some support
in the Texas cases. Under this doctrine the courts apply a less
strict test and require less evidence to establish a partnership as
to a third person, even in the absence of the elements of partnership
by estoppel, than to show the existence of a partnership as among
the partners." In Texas the doctrine manifests itself in a tendency
on the part of the courts to give more weight to the "actual in-
tention," including expressions of intent, of the alleged partners
when the question involves rights and obligations among them-
selves," than they do when the dispute is between the alleged
partner and a third person."' One objection to the doctrine is its
of ultimate control" presumably refers to the right of each partner to have a voice in
basic changes in policy that will affect the fundamental basis and purpose of the business.
In spite of the fact that the Commissioners' Note to § 6 makes it very clear that "co-
ownership" as used in S 6 does not mean co-ownership of the property or capital employed
in the business, some courts in states which have adopted the act have said that co-owner-
ship of the partnership property is necessary to the existence of a partnership. Walker,
Mosby & Calvert, Inc. v. Burgess, 153 Va. 779, 151 S.E. 165 (1930); see also Nelson v.
Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 749, 177 P.2d 931, 933 (1947); Northampton Brewery Corp.
v. Lande, 138 Pa. Super. 235, 239, 10 A.2d 583, 585 (1940). On the other hand, other
courts have recognized that it is co-ownership of the business, and not of the partnership
property, that is the prerequisite. Tower v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1949);
Provident Trust Co. v. Rankin, 333 Pa. 412, 5 A.2d 214 (1939).
I fDavis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
19See, e.g., Strawn Nat'l Bank v. Marchbanks, 74 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
error ref. (X proposed to furnish the grass and care for cattle to be purchased in Y's
name with money put up by Y, the profits on the sale of the cattle to be split equally.
Held, X was not Y's partner in the venture, the court emphasizing X's lack of a property
interest in the cattle.)
"0See Harding v. Giddings, 256 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), rev'd, 267 S.W.
9.76 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Altgelt v. Elmendorf, 86 S.W. 41, 43 (Tex. Civ. App.
1905) motion for rehearing granted, for statements indicating that the Texas Supreme
Court applies different tests in the two types of cases.
"'Donald v. Phillips, 13 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) and cases cited note 22
supra. But see Commission of Appeals' decision in Harding v. Giddings, supra note 20 (the
Court of Civil Appeals held no partnership because terms of agreement denominated a
"lease contract" did not evidence an intention on the part of the parties to become part-
ners. The Commission of Appeals reversed, saying: "The terms of this contract evidence
an intention on the part of the parties thereto to engage in a business undertaking with
each other, which in law constitutes a partnership." 267 S.W. 976, 977.)
"'"The question of the intention of the parties is proper for a jury to take into con-
sideration in determining whether or not a partnership has been actually formed. It is not,
however, absolutely necessary for the jury to find that each party actually intended a part-
nership to be formed in order to create said relationship. Regardless of the intention of the
parties, if, as a matter of fact, a partnership was actually formed, all partners thereby
became bound as such." Allison v. Campbell, 35 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
error dism. For other statements to the effect that as to third persons parties may be part-
ners in spite of their intention that there should be no partnership, see Freeman v. Huttig
Sash & Door Co., 105 Tex. 560, 571-72, 153 S.W. 122, 125 (1913); Brown v. Watson,
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vagueness and uncertainty." In addition there is no valid reason
for imposing liability to a third person on someone associated with
the owner of a business in some such capacity as lender or landlord,
where there are no elements of estoppel present, if there are missing
from their relationship certain attributes essential to their being
held partners inter se. The act eliminates these objections by de-
claring that except in the case of partnership by estoppel "persons
who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third
persons.""4
In connection with the related problem of partnership by estoppel,
the act also eliminates an uncertainty that exists in the present
Texas law. Under the doctrine of "partner by estoppel" one (called
the "ostensible partner") who has held himself out, or permitted
himself to be held out as a partner of another, is estopped to deny
the existence of a partnership as against one who has extendea
credit to the supposed partnership in reliance on such holding out."'
There is a split of authority among the states as to whether mere
inaction on the part of a person who, to his knowledge but with-
out his permission or assent, is being held out as a partner by another
is sufficient to make the former a partner by estoppel."' This exact
cuestion seems never to have been decided in Texas, although
there is language in at least one case indicating that the doctrine
may be applied where the ostensible partner was merely aware
of the holding out and did nothing about it."' The Commissioners
decided that those authorities requiring actual consent represent
"the better reasoning,""' and they followed them in section 16(1)."
72 Tex. 216, 221, 10 S.W. 395, 396 (1888); Cothran v. Marmaduke & Brown, 60 Tex.
370, 372 (1883).
" Confusing statements such as the following are not uncommon: "And while profit-
sharing may, in a controversy between third parties, on the one hand, and the supposed
partners, on the other, be evidence . . . of partnership, it is so (to the extent it is true)
because in that situation actual intention may be made to yield to 'legal intentions' . . .
whereas in charges and countercharges inter sese actual intent should control." Donald v.
Phillips, 13 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). "What they call their agreement
and make it determine their relation unless their actual intent is nevertheless to be part-
ners." 32 Tex. Jur., Partnership § 13 (1934) (referring to the rights of the parties as
among themselves).
145 7(l).
2Representation by ostensible partner: Walker v. Brown, 66 Tex 556, 1 S.W. 797
(1886); Crozier, Rhea & Co. v. Kirker, 4 Tex. 252 (1849). Holding out by another:
Bivins v. Oldham, 224 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref.; Southern Agricultural
Works v. Sims, 26 S.W. 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
a5See Commissioners' Note to S 16; Crane, Partnership S 36 (2d ed. 1952).
""It would appear that a reasonably prudent man, knowing that his name was im-
properly used in a business, would have notified all persons whom he knew or had reason to
think were relying on the existence of such partnership." Bivins v. Oldham, 224 S.W. 240,
244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref.
lSCommissioners' Note to S 16; Lewis, supra note 15,. at 625. .
29 Note, however, that even following the adoption of the act in Maryland, it has been
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The position taken by the act on this point is in line with usual
estoppel principles, under which a party is estopped to deny a fact
only if he creates or contributes to misleading appearances or ac-
quiesces in their creation by another; and it is supported by the
argument that it is unfair to require one whose name is being
used without permission to take affirmative action to dispel the
misleading appearances thereby created.
II. PROBLEMS INVOLVING PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
Partnership property and the interest of the partners, their as-
signees and creditors therein, is one area of partnership law which
has given rise to a great many problems, and in which the act makes
some of its most significant contributions. The main source of difficul-
ty is that the early common-law courts, recognizing that partners
understand themselves to be co-owners of the business, felt con-
strained to apply one of the usual common-law forms of co-owner-
ship to partnership property. Thus they decided that partners hold
partnership property as joint tenants,0 and they applied the various
legal incidents of such tenancy, although frequently inappropriate
to property devoted to a business enterprise. The act, on the other
hand, proceeds upon the theory that the orthodox forms of common-
law co-ownership do not fit the partnership relation, and it creates
an entirely new form of co-ownership, the incidents of which
are designed to meet the practical necessities of the relationship.3
stated that knowledge by the ostensible partner of the unauthorized holding out is suffi-
cient to make him a partner by estoppel unless he does all that a reasonable and honest
man would do to deny the relationship. McBriety v. Phillips, 180 Md. 569, 578, 26 A.2d
400, 405 (1942). But see Note, 6 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1942), which suggests that the court
in the McBriety case may merely be saying that under some circumstances failure to
repudiate the holding out may be evidence of the obstensible partner's consent.
"Heydon v. Heydon, i Salk. 392, 91 Eng. Rep. 340 (K.B. 1693), explained in Lewis,
supra note 15, at 630-31.
" Many partnership property problems could also have been solved by defining the
partnership as a separate legal person or entity which owns the property devoted to the
business. This entity theory of the nature of a partnership is sometimes called the "mercan-
tile theory" by its proponents on the ground that businessmen think of partnerships as
separate persons. It is contrary to the common-law idea that the legal nature of a partner-
ship is an association of persons carrying on a business as co-owners, or the so-called "ag-
gregate" theory. See Crane, Partnership S 3 (2d ed. 1952). The Texas courts, following
the common-law view, have repeatedly stated that the partnership is not a separate legal
entity, a pronouncement that has sometimes affected the outcome of the problem at hand.
Frank v. Tatum, 87 Tex. 204, 25 S.W. 409 (1894) (since partnership not a legal entity,
all partners must be joined as parties defendant, and dismissal as to any deprives court of
jurisdiction over the partnership property); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) error ref. (since partnership not a legal entity, minor child barred from
suing partners among whom was her father); Feldman v. Seay, 291 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) (since partnership not a legal entity, partnership cannot be sued in firm name
19s58 ]
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A. What is Partnership Property?
Before the various problems involving partnership property under
Texas law are developed, the preliminary, and often difficult, ques-
tion of what is partnership property should be mentioned. Pro-
perty originally belonging to a partner, or purchased with money
furnished by him, which is used for partnership purposes may be
separate property of the partner, the use of which is contributed
to the partnership, or it may be that partner's contribution to the
capital of the partnership and thus become partnership property.
Likewise, property purchased with partnership funds may be part-
nership property, or property owned by the partners as co-tenants,
or even property of one of the partners, the purchase price being
a withdrawal from the partnership by him."' Whether a specific
asset is separate or partnership property depends upon the intention
and understanding of the partners, under Texas law" and apparently
under the act."' Unfortunately it is frequently very difficult to dis-
cover the intention of the partners, and resolution of the question
may be largely a matter of speculation. " The act furnishes some
help by providing that property acquired with partnership funds
is partnership property unless a contrary intention appears, " and
the same appears to be true under Texas law."7
and all partners must be joined as parties defendant; later changed by rule of court, see
infra). On the other hand, the partnership has been given separate identity for certain
limited purposes by statute or rule of court. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2033
(1925) (judgment binding partnership property may be had by service of citation upon
one partner); Tex. R. Civ. P. 28 (1941) (partnership may be sued in the firm name).
Dean Ames, the original draftsman of the act, was an advocate of the entity theory and
defined the partnership as a legal person in the first two drafts. See Lewis, supra note 15,
at 640. Dean Lewis, who upon Ames' death became the draftsman, opposed the entity
theory on the ground that while it solves some ditficulties, it creates others; and, with the
approval of the Commissioners, he did not draft the act on that theory. Ibid. The act has
been vigorously criticized by Professor Crane for its failure to define the partnership as a
legal person and staunchly defended by Dean Lewis in a spirited exchange of articles.
Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 762 (1915);
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act- A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 Harv. L.
Rev. 158, 291 (1916); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 Harv.
L. Rev. 838 (1916).
" The distinction between separate and partnership property is important in determin-
ing the rights of partners and creditors in the property.
aSLogan v. Logan, 138 Tex. 40, 156 S.W.2d 507 (1942); Bivins v. Proctor, 80 S.W.2d
307 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935); Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
error ref.; Williams v. Meyer, 64 S.W. 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) error ref.; Luck v. Hop-
kins, 54 S.W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.
"'Such seems to be the effect of the words "on account of the partnership" in S 8(1)
of the act.
a"See, e.g., Luck v. Hopkins, 54 S.W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.
31S 8(2).
"'See Snaman v. Lane, 184 S.W. 366, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref.; Luck v.
Hopkins, 54 S.W. 429, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.
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B. Rights of the Partners in Partnership Property
The Texas courts, like other common-law courts,"s have long
recognized that it is impossible to apply to property devoted to a
business enterprise all of the incidents of joint tenancy, under which,
for example, any of the partners would be free to do as he wished
with his interest in the common property, irrespective of the claims
of the other partners arising out of the business. Therefore, al-
though co-ownership of partnership property is an outgrowth of
common-law joint tenancy, certain distinct characteristics of
partnership tenure have been developed.
The courts have adapted common-law co-ownership to partnership
property by holding that each partner has an equitable interest
in or lien on the entire partnership property to the extent necessary
to carry out the partnership purposes.3 Under this principle, some-
times called the doctrine of "partners' equities,"' each partner is
entitled to have the partnership property applied to the payment
of partnership debts."' Thus, a partner may not without the con-
sent of his co-partners assign or mortgage his share of part or all of
the partnership property, free of his co-partners' liens, leaving them
to satisfy partnership debts out of their shares.' Likewise, although
in Texas a partner may fasten a homestead exemption on his share
of partnership real property,"' he may not do so without the con-
sent of his co-partners if the partnership is insolvent." The equitable
lien of each partner on all the partnership property not only pro-
38 For example, at an early date it was held in England that the survivorship incident
of joint tenancy does not apply to the beneficial title in the case of partnership joint
tenancy. Martin v. Crump, 2 Salk. 444, 91 Eng. Rep. 385 (K.B. 1698).
3' "As every partner is liable for the debts of his firm, and owns its property in com-
mon with other partners, it is his right to have the common property applied to the pay-
ment of partnership debts, and all the other partners, without his consent, cannot take this
right from him. This right is sometimes said to give every partner an equitable lien on
firm assets .. " Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 668-69, 26 S.W. 939, 940 (1894).
40Crane, Partnership § 40 (2d ed. 1952).
"'Warren v. Wallis, Landes & Co., 38 Tex. 225 (1873); Egan v. American State Bank,
67 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.; Bolding v. Bolding, 200 S.W. 587 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918) error dism.
"Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543, 15 S.W. 569 (1891) (pledge to secure separate
indebtedness); Sherk v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 S.W. 507 (Tex. Comm. App. 1918)
(mortgage to secure separate indebtedness); Kennard v. Kennard, 84 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935) error dism. (assignments to secure separate indebtedness).
Likewise, a separate creditor of one of the partners may not attach his interest in partner-
ship property, free of the equitable liens of the other partners. Warren v. Wallis, Landes &
Co., supra note 41.
"'Egan v. American State Bank, 67 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
" Egan v. American State Bank, supra note 43; Williams v. Meyer, 64 S.W. 66 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1901). It has been held, however, that if the firm is solvent, a partner can
subject his interest in partnership realty to a homestead exemption without his co-partners'
consent, and that his interest in such property cannot be charged with future partnership
debts even if the firm later becomes insolvent. Swearingen v. Bassett, 65 Tex. 275 (1886).
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tects him against having to bear a disproportionate amount of the
partnership debts upon dissolution, but it also prevents firm assets
from being removed before the accounts are settled among the
partners and secures to each his proper share of the assets upon dis-
solution." In order that the surviving partners may receive the same
protection upon the death of a partner, the Texas cases hold that
if it is necessary for partnership real property to be used to pay
partnership debts or settle partnership accounts, the surviving part-
ners take the full equitable title for such purpose, instead of taking
as tenants in common with the heirs of the deceased partners."'
Still another aspect of the partners' equities doctrine is that it
secures each partner in his right to have the partnership property
remain in the business for the proper conduct of firm affairs so
long as the partnership continues. This right, together with the
principle that partnership property belongs to the firm and the
partners have no individual property right in, and no right during
the existence of the partnership to exclusive possession or use of,
any partnership property,"' insure that such property is available
for firm business during the existence of the partnership.
Out of the partners' equities doctrine has arisen the principle
that a partner's interest in partnership property is merely his pro-
portionate share of the surplus remaining after the payment of
partnership debts and the settlement of accounts among the part-
ners."' Such interest is all that he may effectively assign or mortgage
without the consent of his co-partners, ' for he has no specific in-
"Harrison v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See Wiggins v. Black-
shear, 86 Tex. 665, 669, 26 S.W. 939, 940 (1894).
"eMartin v. Dial, 57 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). See Miller v. Howell, 234
S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Donnell v. Talley, 104 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) error dism. by agr.
The surviving partners may sell the partnership realty to pay firm debts or settle partner-
ship accounts. Smith v. Wayman, 148 Tex. 318, 224 S.W.2d 211 (1949). See Dial v.
Martin, 37 S.W.2d 166, 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 57 S.W.2d 75
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933). Although the surviving partners can only convey equitable title,
the purchaser can compel the heirs of the deceased partner to convey legal title to him.
See Smith v. Wayman, 216 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), aff'd, 148 Tex. 318,
224 S.W.2d 211 (1949); Dial v. Martin, supra at 178.
If partnership realty is not needed to pay firm debts or to adjust the accounts among the
partners, the surviving partners become tenants in common with the heirs of the deceased
partner. Donnell v. Talley, supra; Isbell v. Southworth, 114 S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908).
"'Warren v. Wallis, Landes & Co., 38 Tex. 225 (1873). See Sherk v. First Nat'l Bank,
206 S.W. 507, 509 (Tex. Comm. App. 1918); Miller v. Howell, 234 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951); Egan v. American State Bank, 67 S.W.2d 1081, 1084 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) error ref.
41Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543, 15 S.W. 569 (1891); Sherk v. First Nat'l Bank,
supra note 47; Egan v. American State Bank, supra note 47. See Miller v. Howell, 234
S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
4" Oliphant v. Markham, supra note 48; Still v. Focke, 66 Tex. 715, 2 S.W. 59 (1886);
Sherk v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 48. For the effect of a conveyance of specific part-
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terest in any particular part of the firm property."' Unfortunately,
there is some confusion in the Texas cases as to the effect of a
purported conveyance of specific partnership property by one
partner without his co-partners' consent at a time when the partner-
ship is solvent. 1 One case seems to hold that such a conveyance
passes nothing because the partner's interest in the specific property
is too remote to permit him to convey any interest therein."
Other cases, however, indicate that if the partnership is solvent, a
mortgage or other conveyance of specific partnership property
gives the mortgagee or grantee a lien on the property to the extent
of the conveying partner's interest in the surplus," or even an
undivided one-half interest in the property conveyed."4
There are other problems in connection with the interest of
the partners in partnership property which are not eliminated by
the partners' equities doctrine. For example, the Texas courts hold
that if a partner assigns his interest in all of the partnership pro-
perty, either to a third person or to a co-partner, the partnership
is dissolved." Frequently such an assignment to a third person is
made simply to secure an indebtedness of the assigning partner,
who does not intend to disassociate himself from the business.'
Under such circumstances there seems to be no reason why the
assignment should necessarily result in dissolution. Moreover, even
where the assigning partner does intend to terminate his association
with the partnership, there is no reason why, in the case of a part-
nership for a term, the remaining partners should be prevented
from carrying on the business in accordance with the partnership
agreement and should be forced to wind up the partnership and
divide the property.' Thus in the case of an assignment for se-
nership property made with the consent of the other partners, see text accompanying notes
68-74 infra.
so See cases cited note 47 supra.
"' Of course, if the partnership is insolvent, such a conveyance passes nothing, since
there is no surplus in which the conveying partner is entitled to share. Sherk v. First Nat'l
Bank, 206 S.W. 507 (Tex. Comm. App. 1918).
"Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543, 15 S.W. 569 (1891).
: See Sherk v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 S.W. 507, 509 (Tex. Comm. App. 1918).
'Tom v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
" Moore v. Steele, 67 Tex. 435, 3 S.W. 448 (1887) (transfer to third person); Sherk
v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 S.W. 507 (Tex. Comm. App. 1918) (transfer to co-partner).
5eSee Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 Yale L.J. 617, 626 (1915).
" Of course, it is clear that the assignee cannot be permitted to step into his assignor's
shoes as a partner without the consent of the non-assigning partners. The right of partners
to select their co-partners is based upon the facts that partners stand in a fiduciary relation
to each other and that each has the power to dispose of firm property and to incur obliga-
tions binding upon his co-partners. This idea is commonly expressed by the statement that
an important element of the partnership relation is delectus personae, the choice of the
person. See Johnston v. Winn, 105 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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curity the Texas courts have not solved the problem of how to
protect the assignee of a partner's interest without unduly dis-
turbing his relationship with the business and the rights of the
remaining partners.
Section 25 (1) of the act attacks these problems caused by apply-
ing an orthodox common-law form of co-ownership to partnership
property by establishing a new form of co-ownership of property
for partnerships, called "tenancy in partnership." Although the
act does not define the partnership as a separate legal person,"
the incidents of tenancy in partnership enumerated in section
25(2) are consistent with the entity theory." The incidents in-
corporate all of the desirable features of the partners' equities
doctrine as applied in Texas and eliminate some of the problems
that still exist in the Texas law.
The first incident of tenancy in partnership is that each partner
has the right to possess firm property for partnership purposes, but
no right to possess it for any other purpose, which is also the rule
under the Texas cases. ° In section 25 (2) (b) it is provided that
a partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable
except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the part-
ners in the same property.61 All that a partner may separately
assign under the act is his interest in the partnership, which is
defined in section 26 as "his share of the profits and surplus." Thus,
under the act, as under the partners' equities doctrine, a partner
is not free to remove specific property from the partnership with-
out the consent of his co-partners. Tenancy in partnership also
gives some measure of protection against the removal of partnership
property from the reach of partnership creditors, section 26(2) (c)
providing that when partnership property is attached for a partner-
ship debt, no right under the homestead or exemption laws can
be claimed by the partners." A fourth incident of tenancy in
partnership is that a deceased partner's right in specific partnership
property vests, for partnership purposes, in the surviving partner
which, in effect, is also the rule under present Texas law." The
final incident is that a partner's right in specific partnership pro-
58 See note 31 supra for discussion.
S'Crane, Partnership S 40 (2d ed. 1952); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act -A
Criticism, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 762, 772-73 (1915). Section 25(2) lists the incidents.
60 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
" Section 25(2)(b) also deals with the rights of separate creditors in specific partner-
ship property. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text.
asFor a comparison between S 25(2)(c) and the present Texas law, see notes 82-86
infra and accompanying text.
63 See note 43 supra and accompanying text; note 46 supra.
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perty is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowance to widows, heirs,
or next of kin.
The act's treatment of the property rights of a partner decidedly
improves upon the Texas law of common-law co-ownership as
modified by the partners' equities principle. In the first place the
act is realistic in abandoning traditional common-law co-ownership
as unsuited to the ownership of property devoted to a business
enterprise. In establishing a new kind of co-ownership for the
special situation of the partnership, it eliminates the necessity of
modifying an inappropriate form of ownership by exceptions,
which is always an unsatisfactory way of dealing with an unique
problem.
More important, however, is the manner in which the act deals
with some of the specific problems not solved by the partners'
equities doctrine. The provision of section 25(2) (b) that a part-
ner's right in specific partnership property can only be assigned in
connection with an assignment by all the partners of their rights
therein clears up the confusion as to what interest passes when
one partner attempts a separate assignment. Under this provision
such an assignment is invalid and no interest in the property
passes to the assignee." Even under the act, however, an attempted
assignment by a partner of his rights in all the partnership property
may be regarded as a valid assignment of his interest in the part-
nership. 5
In section 27 it is provided that an assignment of a partner's
interest in the partnership does not necessarily dissolve the partner-
ship, nor does it give the assignee the right to take his assignor's
place as an active partner, but it merely gives him the right to
receive the profits to which his assignor is entitled under the part-
nership agreement. " Thus, the act, unlike the Texas cases, solves
completely the problem of how to protect the assignee of a part-
"Johnston v. Ellis, 49 Idaho 1, 285 Pac. 1015 (1930); Windom Nat'l Bank v. Klein,
191 Minn. 447, 254 N.W. 602 (1934); Lewis, supra note 56, at 634 ("... a partner may
assign partnership property for a partnership purpose, but if he attempts to assign the
property for his own purposes he makes no assignment at all, because the Act destroys the
quality of assignability for any but a partnership purpose.") According to the Commis-
sioners' Note to § 25, an attempted assignment by a partner of his interest in specific part-
nership property cannot be treated as a conveyance of a fractional part of his interest in
the partnership because of the impossibility of determining what fractional part of his
interest he intended to assign.
" Johnston v. Ellis, note 64 supra; Commissioners' Note to § 25.
66Section 27 is designed to protect the rights of the non-assigning partners from dis-
turbance only during the balance of the term of the partnership remaining after the assign-
ment. Under S 32(2) the purchaser of a partner's interest may obtain a dissolution of the
partnership by decree of court after the specified term of the partnership has expired, or
at any time if the partnership was a partnership at will at the time of the assignment.
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ner's interest without unduly disturbing the rights of the remaining
partners, and of how to protect the relationship with the busi-
ness of the assigning partner where he has merely assigned his in-
terest to secure a separate debt.
Section 25(2) (d), which provides that the title to the specific
partnership property passes to the surviving partners upon the
death of a partner, also is an improvement over the present Texas
law. Although the Texas cases hold that the surviving partners
take equitable title to partnership real estate if it is needed to pay
partnership debts or settle partnership accounts, and that they may
sell the property for those purposes, the purchaser only acquires
equitable title and must seek court aid to compel the heirs of the
deceased partner to convey the legal title to him." Under section
25(2) (d), on the other hand, the surviving partners may under
such circumstances convey full legal title to partnership real estate
without any joinder in the conveyance by the heirs or any aid
from the courts.
C. Rights of Partnership Creditors in Partnership Property
One of the most serious defects in the present Texas law of
partnerships is its failure to afford adequate protection to the
rights of partnership creditors. Under Texas law partnership credi-
tors have no lien or claim on partnership assets until acquired by
attachment or execution." Their only right in partnership property
is one of subrogation to the partners' right to have firm assets ap-
plied to the payments of firm debts in order to do justice among
the partners."9 This right is sometimes called a quasi-lien." Since
67 See note 46 supra.
"SWiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S.W. 939 (1894); Stansell v. Fleming, 81
Tex. 294, 16 S.W. 1033 (1891); White v. Parish, 20 Tex. 689 (1858); Hawkins v. Wes-
tern Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W. 1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Waples-Platter Co. v. Mitchell,
35 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) error ref.; Johnston v. Standard Shoe Co., 24 S.W.
580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
"9 The following language is found in Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 669, 26 S.W.
939, 940 (1894):
That a partnership creditor has no specific lien, either legal or equitable, upon part-
nership assets, any more than any individual creditor has upon the estate of his debtor,
is so firmly established that citation of authority in support of the proposition is use-
less; but they may acquire liens by contract, or through the process of a court by
which the creditors may acquire liens on specific property.
The rule is thus well stated: "A creditor of a partnership has, as a general rule, no
direct lien upon the partnership property until he acquires it by legal process, that is,
by the levy of an attachment or of an execution. His indirect or quasi lien is de-
rived from the lien or equity of the individual partners. If the partners are not in a
condition to enforce an equitable lien upon the partnership property, the creditors of
the partnership cannot enforce a lien derived from them or from one of them. The
equity of the partnership creditor continues so long as the equity of the individual
partner continues, and no longer." Jones, Liens, 788.
When, however, the property of a partnership passes into the custody of a court for
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a general creditor's quasi-lien is a derivative interest, dependent
upon the equitable liens of the partners, it is lost when the partners
lose their liens. Thus, in the following situations the equities of the
partners in specific partnership property, and with them the quasi-
liens of partnership creditors, are extinguished, thereby reducing
the amount of property to which such creditors have first claim:
(a) partnership property is applied to the payment of the separate
debts of one or more of the partners with the consent of the
others; 1 (b) a partner fastens a homestead exemption on his in-
terest in firm property with the consent of his co-partners;"' (c)
partnership assets are transferred to some of the partnership credi-
tors in payment of their claims; (d) partnership property is trans-
ferred to one or more of the partners with the consent of the others;
(e) all the partnership assets are divided among the partners. 3
Likewise, if one of two partners sells his interest in the partnership,
or in all its property, to his co-partner without reserving his
equitable right to have the partnership property applied to the
payment of firm debts, the partnership is dissolved, its property
becomes the separate property of the purchasing partner and the
equitable lien of the selling partner, and the rights of the firm
creditors through him, are lost."'
In the latter three situations, of course, the property is added
to the separate property of one or more of the partners, where the
creditors of the partnership may still reach it. It might therefore
appear that the partnership creditors are not injured by such trans-
fers of the partnership property, even if the partnership is in-
administration, as in cases of bankruptcy or assignment made by an insolvent firm,
then the court will administer it as was the right of the several partners to have it
administered while controlled by themselves.
In such cases the court's action is based as fully upon the rights of the partners as
between themselves as upon the rights of creditors ...
7 Wiggins v. Blackshear, supra note 69; Hawkins v. Western Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.
1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Johnston v. Standard Shoe Co., 24 S.W. 580 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1893).
71 Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S.W. 939 (1894); Tom v. First Nat'l Bank,
104 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Luck v. Hopkins, 54 S.W. 429 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1899) error dism.
7"See Egan v. American State Bank, 67 S.W.2d 1081, 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
error ref.
7 See Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 670, 26 S.W. 939, 940-41 (1894).
'Willis v. Satterfield, 85 Tex. 301, 20 S.W. 155 (1892); Willis v. Heath, 18 S.W.
801 (Tex. 1891); Stansell v. Fleming, 81 Tex. 294, 16 S.W. 1033 (1891); Sanchez v.
Goldfrank, 27 S.W. 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
The seller's equitable lien and the creditor's quasi-liens are lost even if the purchasing part-
ner agrees to pay all the partnership debts, unless the selling partner reserves the right to
have the partnership property applied to the payment of partnership debts. Stansell v.




solvent. Once the assets become separate property, however, the
partnership creditors lose their priority and are only entitled to
share pro rata with separate creditors so far as that property
is concerned."'
Removal of partnership assets from the business in any of the
above ways, with the resultant loss by the partnership creditors
of their quasi-liens therein, does not impair the rights of such
creditors too seriously if the partnership is solvent. So long as the
partnership is neither insolvent nor thereby rendered insolvent, any
such disposition of specific partnership property by the partners
will not injure partnership creditors, except to the extent that it
reduces the margin of safety of partnership assets in excess of
liabilities. Transfer of partnership property to a third person or
a partner without an equal amount of new assets being received
by the partnership made at a time when the firm is insolvent,
however, may seriously injure partnership creditors unless the
transfer can be set aside." Under the Texas fraudulent conveyance
statute only transfers made with an "intent to delay, hinder or
defraud creditors," or voluntarily made by an insolvent debtor
"not upon consideration deemed valuable in law," are void as against
prior creditors."7 It has been held, however, that a conveyance or
mortgage of his share of partnership property by a partner in an
insolvent partnership with the consent of his co-partners, made to
pay or secure his individual debts, is not fraudulent as to part-
nership creditors." Likewise, the Texas courts hold that the pay-
"'Roberson v. Tonn, 76 Tex. 535, 13 S.W. 385 (1890); Higgins v. Rector, 47 Tex.
361 (1877). See Webb v. Gregory, 108 S.W. 478, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
76 In determining whether the partnership is insolvent, the solvency of the partners
must be taken into account, since their separate property can be reached by the partner-
ship creditors. See note 93 infra. If the partners have sufficient surpluses of assets in excess
of their separate debts to equal a deficit in the partnership accounts, the partnership is not
insolvent. See note 214 infra. Thus, if the partners who withdraw partnership property
and add it to their separate property are not insolvent, the solvency of the partnership and
the rights of the partnership creditors will not be immediately affected by a transfer of
partnership assets to the partners. Of course, there is always the danger that the partners
who acquire the partnership property will dispose of it without receiving fair consider-
ation therefor, or will become insolvent, and thus the partnership creditors would prefer to
have the partnership assets remain in the business.
"7Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. arts. 3996-3997 (1925).
"SWiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S.W. 939 (1894) (holding that the partners
of an insolvent partnership can lawfully permit each other to pay individual debts out of
their respective shares of the partnership property. ". . . [A]lthough the firm be insolvent,
partners by mutual agreement may, within the limit heretofore noticed, prefer individual
creditors, if this be done in good faith." Wiggins v. Blackshear, id. at 671, 26 S.W. at
941); see also Watts v. Debois, 66 S.W. 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); Texas Drug Co. v.
Baker, 50 S.W. 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.; Batchelor v. Sanger, 38 S.W.
359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
The Supreme Court of Texas has also said that where an insolvent partnership is dis-
solved and the property divided among the partners according to their interests, the trans-
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ment by an insolvent debtor, including a partnership, of the claims
of one or more of its creditors does not, within the meaning of
the fraudulent conveyance statute, hinder, delay, or defraud the
other creditors simply because it prefers the creditors paid." More-
over, where the partnership is solvent, it has been held that a sale
by one partner to his co-partner of all his interest in the partner-
ship assets, the purchasing partner assuming liability for all part-
nership debts, could not hinder, delay, or defraud partnership credi-
tors, who by proceeding against the purchasing partner could
reach the property through judgment and execution." Even if the
partnership is insolvent, such a sale is not necessarily fraudulent
against the partnership creditors, it being necessary for the creditors
to show a primary intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors.'
Thus, under present Texas law creditors of an insolvent partner-
ship are not always entitled to have set aside preferential transfers
to separate or other partnership creditors, or transfers of property
to a partner. While a more stringent Texas fraudulent conveyance
statute might be desirable,"5 the present law is not too damaging
to the creditors of an insolvent partnership in light of the availabili-
ty to them of the National Bankruptcy Act,"' under which the
trustee in bankruptcy can set aside the above kind of transfers."
action is not of itself fraudulent as against partnership creditors since "the property in
the hands of each partner would be subject, as before, to the claims of partnership
creditors as well as others." Wiggins v. Blackshear, supra at 670, 26 S.W. at 941. This
proposition seems to overlook the fact that removal of the property from the partnership
may very well hinder or delay partnership creditors, who by the removal lose their
priority vis-a-vis separate creditors.
"Haas v. Kraus, 86 Tex. 687, 27 S.W. 256 (1894); Ellis v.Vallentine, 65 Tex. 532 (1886)(extensive discussion of "hinder" and "delay" as those terms are used in the fraudulent
conveyance statute); Chesher v. Clamp, 30 S.W. 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 895).
" Stansell v. Fleming, 81 Tex. 294, 16 S.W. 1033 (1891). This proposition is subject
to the same defect referred to in note 78 supra.
8'See Sanchez v. Goldfrank, 27 S.W. 204, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
" Greater protection is given partnership creditors by the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyances Act, not in force in Texas, § 8 of which reads as follows:
Every conveyance of partnership property and every partnership obligation incurred
when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to
partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation incurred,
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership
debts, or
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership as dis-
tinguished from consideration to the individual partners.
Although "fair consideration to the partnership" is not defined, it would seem that there
is no "fair consideration" when partnership assets are used to pay or secure a partner's
separate obligation, but that there is when they are used to pay or secure a partnership
debt, even though such transfer might constitute a preference. See Crane, Partnership 5 46
(2d ed. 1952).
6330 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1952).
84Under S 60(b) of the National Bankruptcy Act, the trustee may avoid any "pref-
erence" and recover the property if the creditor receiving it had, at the time of the
transfer, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 11 U.S.C. S 96(b)
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No provision as to the validity of such transfers is made in the
Uniform Partnership Act, which relies on the local law of fraudu-
lent conveyances and the bankruptcy act to protect the credi-
tors of an insolvent partnership."s The act, however, does give
partnership creditors one kind of protection which they do not
have under present Texas law by denying to the partners, as against
partnership creditors, any right under the homestead or exemption
laws in partnership property attached for a partnership debt."'
The position of the partnership creditor is much more precarious
in another situation, that in which the partnership is dissolved by
the retirement or addition of a partner and the business is carried
on by a new partnership without liquidation of the partnership
affairs. This situation can arise when a partner with the consent
(1952). A preference is defined in § 60(a) (1) of the National Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96(a) (1), as "a transfer . ..of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of
a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class." In
addition, § 70(e) (1) declares null and void as against the trustee any transfer which is
fraudulent under any federal or state law applicable thereto. II U.S.C. S 110(e) (1)(1952), Section 67(d)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(4) (1952), provides: "Every transfer of
partnership property and every partnership obligation incurred within one year prior to
the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against the partnership,
when the partnership is insolvent or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to
partnership creditors existing at the time of such transfer or obligation, without regard to
actual intent if made or incurred (a) to a partner, whether with or without a promise by
him to pay partnership debts, or (b) to a person not a partner without fair consideration
to the partnership as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners." Trans-
fers made within one year of bankruptcy "without fair consideration by a debtor who is
or will be thereby rendered insolvent," or made "with actual intent . . . to hinder, delay or
defraud" creditors, are declared fraudulent by S 67(d) (2). 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1952).
In spite of the broad protection afforded partnership creditors by the National Bank-
ruptcy Act, those who are unable or unwilling to proceed thereunder could very well be
adversely affected by the gaps in the Texas fraudulent conveyance statute, as interpreted
by the Texas courts.
9 See Crane, supra note 59, at 774-76, criticizing the act for its failure to deal with this
subject, An earlier draft of the act did contain a fraudulent conveyances section, which
read as follows:
Seventh Draft. Sec. 21. (Fraudulent Conveyances.) (1) Every conveyance or encum-
brance of partnership property by a partner made or given voluntarily and without a
present and fair consideration to the partnership, as distinguished from a consideration
to the individual members, when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent
or in contemplation of insolvency, shall be void as against the partnership creditors, ex-
cept as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration.
(2) Every conveyance or encumbrance of partnership property, every obligation in-
curred and every judicial proceeding taken by any partner, with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any partnership creditor, or other person, of his demand against the part-
nership or which will have this effect, is void as against the partnership creditors,
except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration.
(3) Under the provisions of this section every conveyance or encumbrance of part-
nership property by any partner, to any partner made when the partnership or the as-
signee partner is insolvent, is void as against the partnership creditors, whether such
insolvency be known to the partners or not. Ibid. See note 91 infra.
8S 25(2) (c). Of course, under S 2 5(2) (b) all the partners could assign specific
partnership property to one of the partners, who could then fasten a homestead exemption
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of his co-partners sells his interest in the partnership or all the
partnership property to a third person (or to one or more of his
co-partners and a third person), when there are three or more
partners and one sells his interest to the others, or when the part-
ners admit a new partner into the business. In all these cases the
first partnership is dissolved;8 7 and if the business is continued with-
out liquidation of the affairs of the partnership, the assets become
the property of the new partnership, and the equitable lien of the
seller and the quasi-liens of the creditors of the first partnership are
lost."' Of course, the creditors of the first partnership continue as
creditors of the members of that firm,8" but they are not regarded
as creditors of the new partnership; and the creditors of the new
partnership have priority as to its property, including that which
originally belonged to the first partnership." The practical result
is that the claims of the creditors of the first partnership may not
be satisfied even though at the time of its dissolution it may have
been solvent and the business may have been continued without
upon it. In order to do so, however, the property would have to be removed from the
business, which the other partners might be unwilling to do.
It is not clear in Texas whether the other family exemptions, beside the homestead
exemption, provided for in art. 3832, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925), such as that for tools
of a trade, prevent partnership creditors from reaching such property. B. C. Evans Co. v.
Kingsbury, 25 S.W. 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), holds that one partner cannot make
partnership property exempt from attachment by partnership creditors, as household goods,
by placing the property in his house. In that case, however, it is not made clear whether
the rights of the partnership creditors are dependent upon the equitable liens of the other
partners; if so, such an exemption could be accomplished if all the partners consent to the
removal of the property from the partnership. The court did state that if partnership
property is sold by the firm to a partner with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud
partnership creditors, the sale is void; this statement seems to imply that a partner may,
with the consent of his co-partners, remove partnership property and use it in such a way
as to exempt it from attachment by partnership creditors, if there is no intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud the creditors.87 See note 55 supra. Cf. Dillard v. John Chatmas Wholesale, 286 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) (stating, with some confusion of thought, that a sale of a partnership
interest without compliance with the Bulk Sales Law, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4001(1945), rendered the continuing partnership liable for the debts of the prior partnership).
"Hawkins v. Western Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W. 1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Bell v.
Beazley, 45 S.W. 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
Even if the partnership is insolvent at the time one partner sells his interest to a third
person, so that its effect may be to hinder or delay creditors of the partnership, the sale
is not void as a fraudulent conveyance so long as it was real, and not simulated, and was
not made for the purpose of defrauding the partnership creditors. Bell v. Beazley, 45 S.W.
at 402.
"White v. Boone, 71 Tex. 714, 12 S.W. 51 (1888); Frost v. First State Bank & Trust
Co., 276 S.W. 222 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925). They also continue as creditors of the first
partnership, but this position will ordinarily do them no good since all of the property of
that partnership has become the property of the new partnership.
"Cases cited note 88 supra; Lewis, supra note 56, at 635.
A promise by the new partner to assume the liabilities of the old partnership does not
preserve the quasi-liens of the creditors of that partnership; it merely gives them a per-
sonal claim against the new partner. Bell v. Beazley, 45 S.W. 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
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any notice to the creditors of the change in make-up of the partner-
ship.
This inequitable result is eliminated by section 41 of the act,
which proceeds upon the theory that all rights of partnership
creditors in partnership property should not be lost merely be-
cause of a change in the membership of the firm, if the business
is carried on without liquidation of the debts of the dissolved
partnership."1 To that end, section 41(1) provides that when such
a change takes place without liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership, either by the admission of a new partner or the
retirement or death of a partner and the assignment of his interest
to some or all of those continuing the business, the creditors of the
dissolved partnership become creditors of the partnership con-
tinuing the business. The effect of section 41 (1) is that the creditors
of the first partnership do not lose their quasi-liens on the partner-
ship property, but rather are given an equal claim on the property
of the new partnership with those who extend credit after the
dissolution of the first partnership caused by a change in person-
nel.'" Section 41(2) provides a corresponding solution for the
situation in which all the partners assign their interests to one
partner, who continues the business without liquidation of partner-
ship debts; it makes partnership creditors separate creditors of
the partner continuing the business (and of the partnership if the
remaining partner takes in one or more new partners), whether he
promises to pay the debts of the dissolved partnership or not.'3
" "The paragraph as a whole, as well as this entire section, is based on the opinion that
when there is a continuous business carried on first by A, B and C, and then by A, B,C and D, orbyBor C, or by B and C, byBand D, or by C and D, or by B, C and D,
without any liquidation of the affairs of A, B, C, both justice and business convenience re-quire that all the creditors of the business, irrespective of the exact grouping of the owners
at the times their respective claims had their origin, should be treated alike, all being given
an equal claim on the property embarked in the business." Commissioners' Note to S 41.
"Another possible approach to this problem would have been to declare the transfer
of property from the first partnership to the new one a fraudulent conveyance and thus
void as against the creditors of the first partnership. This approach was not adopted sincethe effect of re-transferring the property to the first partnership is to deprive creditors
of the new partnership of any claim to such property until the creditors of the first part-
nership are paid in full, thus placing the new creditors "in as hard a position as that from
which the creditors of the first partnership have been relieved by the court's action."Lewis, supra note 56, at 636. The act has been criticized for letting in new creditors on aparity with the old creditors. Crane, supra note 59, at 778. It would seem, however, thatthe act's solution of this problem is a sensible one since it is based on the realistic attitudethat there is really only one continuous business, even though there has been some changein the group of partners conducting it. Thus, the new creditors as well as the old must be
allowed to share in the partnership property, just as they would have had there been no
change in the personnel of the partnership at the time they extended credit.9a Section 41(2) would not, in effect, change the existing Texas law in regard to theliability of the separate estate of the remaining partner for unsatisfied partnership debts.The Texas cases do not give separate creditors priority over partnership creditors in the
separate estates of the partners, as does S 40(h), (i) of the act. Rather, they hold that a
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In order for the policy of section 41 to be carried out where a
third person is admitted into a going business as a partner, it is,
of course, necessary that the incoming partner be liable for the
existing debts of the partnership, to the extent of his interest in
the partnership property. It is so provided in section 17 of the
act, and the principle is reiterated in section 41(7).'
D. Rights of Separate Creditors in Partnership Property
Assignment by a partner of his interest in the partnership is not
the only way in which the rights of the other partners may be
disturbed under the present Texas law." The same problem is
presented when a partner has been unable to pay his individual
debts, and one of his creditors attempts to attach or levy execu-
tion upon the debtor partner's interest in partnership property.
If separate creditors were permitted to seize partnership property
on attachment or execution, the partnership business would be
subject to crippling interruptions which would injure not only the
debtor partner, but all of the others.
This problem has been recognized in Texas and has been partially
solved by rule 642 of the Rules of Civil Procedure," which pro-
vides that a levy on a partner's interest in partnership property
can be made only by leaving notice of the levy with one or more
of the partners or with a clerk of the partnership."' The courts
partner's separate property is equally liable for partnership debts and personal obligations.
See cases cited note 75 supra. Of course, by making creditors of the dissolved partnership
creditors of the new partnership where the remaining partner and others continue the
business without liquidation of the old partnership's affairs, § 41 (2) does change the exist-
ing law.
Professor Crane has criticized 5 41 (2) because it allows all the separate creditors to
come in on a parity with the creditors of the dissolved partnership. Crane, supra note 59,
at 778. This criticism clearly has merit, at least with respect to the claims of those who
became separate creditors of the purchasing partner before the assignment to him of the
partnership property. They, unlike subsequent creditors who would have extended credit
to the old partnership had it not been dissolved, would have been subordinated to the
claims of the partnership creditors in the partnership property had the firm been continued
without change in personnel.
"'Sections 17 and 41, by subjecting the incoming partner's interest in partnership
property, including that acquired after his admission, to liability for the debts of the old
partnership, would change the present Texas law, under which an incoming partner has
no liability for debts already incurred in the absence of an agreement to that effect. Free-
man v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 105 Tex. 560. 153 S.W. 122 (1913). Sections 17 and
41 (7) do not, however, give the creditors of the first partnership any right in the incoming
partner's separate estate, which can only be reached by those partnership creditors who
extend credit after his admission.
9See notes 5Y-57 supra and accompanying text.
96Rule 642 was formerly embodied in art. 2295, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925). Rule 642
deals expressly only with levy of execution. Rule 598, however, provides: "The writ of
attachment shall be levied in the same manner as is, or may be, the writ of execution upon
similar property."
" Garnishment for the separate debt of a partner does not present the same problem of
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have given teeth to this rule by holding that if a separate creditor
violates it by having an officer seize physical possession of partner-
ship property, the creditor and the officer are both guilty of con-
version." Rule 642, however, does not completely insulate the
partnership assets from separate creditors, for after a separate
creditor has levied upon the debtor partner's interest in the partner-
ship, he may cause that interest to be sold at execution sale,"9 and
the purchaser can realize on the interest by bringing an action for
an accounting."' Such action by the purchaser, of course, spells
the end of the partnership, for it must be wound up and the debtor
partner's interest in the surplus distributed to the purchaser at
the execution sale. The only way in which the other partners can
protect themselves against such a result is either by paying off
the separate creditor at the outset and taking over his claim against
the debtor partner, or by making the highest bid at the execution
sale so that the debtor partner's interest in the partnership does not
fall into the hands of outsiders."' 1
The act, like rule 642, provides as an incident of tenancy in part-
nership that a partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to attachment or execution by his separate creditors. '
Moreover, section 28 provides a much more effective method of
protecting the other partners against being disturbed by a separate
creditor in their use of partnership property than does rule 642.
It establishes an entirely new kind of remedy, called a "charging
order," as the exclusive method by which a separate creditor can
disturbance of the rights of the other partners as does attachment or execution. The Texas
courts, without the aid of a statute or rule of court, have held that a debt due to the
partnership by a third person, or partnership funds in the hands of a third person or the
partnership itself, cannot be garnished by a separate creditor for the individual debt of
one of the partners. Barrett v. Craft, 57 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Belva Oi
Co. v. Lowe, 27 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App 1930); Brown v. Cassidy-Southwestern
Comm'n Co., 225 S.W. 833 (Tex. Civ. App 1920). The rea'on given is that a partner has
no right in specific partnership property, and "that until the settlement of the partnership
business it cannot be affirmed that an individual partner has any specific interest that may
be appropriated to his individual debt." Id. at 835.
"Middlebrook v. Zapp, 79 Tex. 321, 15 S.W. 258 (1891); Leonard v. Worsham, 45
S.W. 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Howell Bros. v. Jones & Owen, 3 Willson Tex. Ct. of
App. (Civ. Cas.) S 208 (1886).
"J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Owens, 161 S.W. 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
1" Jones v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 61 S.W. 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) error ref. See
J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Owens, supra note 97 at 913; Donald v. Carpenter, 27 S.W.
1053, 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Howell Bros. v. Jones & Owen, 3 Willson Tex. Ct. of
App. (Civ. Cas.) S 208 (1886).
" In most cases, probably the only bidders at the execution sale other than the non-
debtor partners will be the separate creditors themselves or speculators engaged in the busi-
ness of buying such interests at execution sales.
'02 S 2 5 (2 ) (c).
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reach the debtor partner's interest in the partnership."3 Under section
28 the separate creditor may, after obtaining a judgment, apply to
a court for an order that' the interest of the debtor partner be
charged with the'payment of the judgment debt and interest. The
court is empowered to appoint a receiver of the debtor partner's
share of the profits and other money due him from the partnership,
or to order a sale of the interest charged. In this way the separate
creditor's claim can be satisfied 'without' in any way upsetting the
business of the partnership or its use of :partnership property, and
there is no need for the partnership to be dissolved simply because
one of the partners is unable to meet his-separate debts.'
E. 'Acquisition and Transfer of. Real Property
in Partnership Name
One of the most serious areas of uncertainty created by the 'a-
plication of traditional common-law rules of ownership to partner-
ship property is that having to do with the ov-neiship of partnership
real property.' Since at common law title to real estate can only be
held by recognized legal persons,' and since" at common law a
partnership is treated as an 'aggregate of the partners rather than
as a separate legal entity, 0' it must follow that a partnership cannot
take title to real estate in its firm name. And in Texas a conveyance
to or by a partnership in the partnership name does not as a general
rule pass the legal title to the property.' 7 Such a principle can only
result in confusion, since in the business world a partnership is
thought of as a separate entity capable of owning real property,
and frequently conveyances are made in. its name. The confusion
has been increased by cases holding that if the name of one or
more partners is contained in the name of the partnership, legal
" The charging order of S 28 was derived from the English Partnership Act. Partner-
ship Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. 229, c. 39. Section 28 has recently been analyzed by Gose,
The Charging Order Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 28 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1953), and
in Note, Charging Orders Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 9 Wyo. L.J. 112 (1955).
104 Section 28(2) provides that the sale of the interest charged will not automatically
cause a dissolution. Under § 32(2), however, the purchaser of a partner's interest may
obtain a dissolution by decree of court after the termination of the specified term of the
partnership or at any time if the partnership was a partnership at will when the charging
order was issued. See note 66 supra.
.. See Dunlap v. Green, 60 Fed. 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1894); Crane, Partnership § 38
(2d ed. 1952).
106 See note 31 supra.
.. See Dunlap v. Green, 60 Fed. 242, 246-47 (5th. Cir. 1894); Frost v. Wolf, 77 Tex.
455, 460-61, 14 S.W. 440, 441-42 (1890); Baldwin v. Richardson & Co., 33 Tex. 16, 30
(1870); Harris v. Bryson & Hartgrove, 80 S.W. 105, 106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) error ref.
But see Hollingsworth v. Wm. Cameron & Co., 160 S.W. 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
(holding that deed to "B. P. Hollingsworth & Bro." passed legal title to one-half interest in
the land to cach of the two partners).
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title passes to those partners, who hold it in trust for the partner-
ship."08 Since only a few cases have arisen in which the exception
has been applied, there remains great uncertainty as to when the
name of a partner is sufficiently identified in the name of the
partnership so that the courts will hold that legal title passes to
him in trust for the partnership."'
The great inequity that could result from a holding that a part-
nership which has paid value for land taken in its name, or a pur-
chaser from a partnership, does not acquire legal title has been
largely obviated by the holding of the courts that even though
legal title does not pass, equitable title does."' Equity can therefore
see that justice is done by requiring the holder of the legal title
to convey it to the party or parties entitled thereto. There still
remain, however, the problems of the cloud on the title which ap-
pear every time the name of a partnership is in a chain of title;
the time, trouble, and expense involved in removing such clouds;
the possibility that the holder of the legal title will make a con-
veyance that cuts off equities before he is forced to convey legal
title to the equitable owners; the practical difficulty that a poten-
tial purchaser of partnership real property faces in deciding whom
he should insist sign the deed as grantors.1 '
The act eliminates these problems by providing in section 8 (3)
that any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership
name, and that title so acquired can be conveyed only in the part-
nership name. Moreover, it also eliminates the uncertainty as to
what kind of title passes when partnership property acquired in
the firm name is not conveyed in the firm name, or when pro-
perty not acquired in the firm name is conveyed by one or more
of the partners. Section 10 makes detailed provision as to what title
passes when title is in the partnership name and a partner conveys
"' Lindsay v. Jaffray, 55 Tex. 626 (1881) (deed to "E. S. Jaffray & Co." passed legal
title to E. S. Jaffray in trust for the partners composing the firm); Gauss-Langenburg Hat
Co. v. Allums, 184 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref. (deed to "C. R. Hooks &
Co." passed legal title to C. R. Hooks in trust for the partnership).
109For example, what would have been the result in Gauss-Langenburg Hat Co. v.
Allums, supra note 108, had the conveyance been made to "C. R. Hooks Co." or "Hooks &
Son"? Would the Texas courts hold that legal title passed to C. R. Hooks, or to Hooks and
his son, in trust for the partnership?
"'Dunlap v. Green, 60 Fed. 242 (5th Cir. 1894); Frost v. Wolf, 77 Tex. 455, 14 S.W.
440 (1890); Baldwin v. Richardson & Co., 33 Tex. 16 (1870); Harris v. Bryson & Hart-
grove, 80 S.W. 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) error ref.
... The safest course for a purchaser to follow is to require that all the partners sign as
grantors, which should protect him if legal title is in one or more of them, or in one or
more of them in trust for the partnership. However, if legal title never passed to any of
the partners, or if the name of a partnership appears earlier in the chain of title, the pur-
chaser might still be faced with the problems mentioned.
[Vol. 12
TEXAS PARTNERSHIP LAW
in his own name; when title is in the name of some, but not all,
of the partners, the record not disclosing the right of the partner-
ship, and those partners convey; when title is in the name of one
or more partners, or a third person in trust for the partnership,
and a partner conveys in the partnership or his own name; and
when title is in the name of all the partners and they all execute
a conveyance. Thus, the act eliminates the confusion and uncertainty
with respect to the conveyance of real property belonging to a
partnership that exist under the common law and the present law of
Texas.
III. RELATIONS AMONG PARTNERS
There is no public need for regulation of the internal relations
among partners comparable to the need for imposing liability on an
ostensible partner or prescribing detailed rules for corporations as
the price of limited liability. Traditionally, partners' relations with
one another have been matters for private agreement, subject only
to the law of contracts. Should legislation attempt to regulate these
relations? If it does not, what point is there in having a statute?
These questions were wisely answered by the framers of the Uni-
form Act. They concluded not to supplant private agreement in
determining partner's relations inter se."'
The drafter of partnership agreements has no less importance
under the act than at common law, but his services will probably
be confined generally to the more elaborate business associations
for which the rather rudimentary provisions of the act are insuf-
ficient. The act will, however, be of great value as a reference, for
it is surprising how many formal agreements are drawn, heedless of
substantive law, to achieve particular results under the intricacies
of the partnership provisions of the federal tax laws."' The act
operates whenever the partners have failed to make a meaningful
agreement on the subject in question. When all partnerships have
clear and comprehensive written agreements, the act (and the
courts) will scarcely be necessary. Until then, the act offers coher-
ence and precision that have not always been available in the Texas
decisions, mired as they are in dicta.
The ensuing discussion assumes that the partners have made no
agreement relevant to the disputed issues.
...S 18 (first clause).
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 701-71.
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A. Profits, Losses, and Capital
The essence of partnership is profit sharing. In general, the part-
ners shar6 equally, even though they may have contributed un-
equally to capital."' The obligation. to 'share losses is a corollary' of
the "commumity of'interests" which gives the right to share pro-
fits." '1 The' partners share losses' in the same proportions as they
share 'profits, even though they may have contributed to capital
in different proportions.1
Implicit in sharing is the question of what is to be shared. There
is little doubt that profits (i.e., net profits) of ordinary business
operations are to be shared." ' Dispute, however, may arise with re-
spect to what are loosely called "capital" losses. The matter is some-
what confused and, may perhaps best be analyzed in terms of the
various arguments advanced..
1. Loss of a Particular Asset*
The loss may be associated with a particular asset, i.e., the asset
has been sold bel6w cost. In this event, it is necessary to know
whether the asset belonged to the partnership or. to one, or more
.of the partners indiyidually."' For illustration, suppose partner X
brings to the partnership a herd of cattle. It is understood that the
cattle, will be grazed and ultimately sold, at which time the profits
will be divided. If the cattle should be sold at a loss, X's co-partners
may argue that the 'cattle, hence the loss, belonged to X alone and
not to the partnership.' More specifically, their position is that X
contributed the "use" but not the "property" of the asset to the
partnership. This, they say, would not entitle them to share in the
asset.if it remained intact, hence should not obligate them to share
114 Johnston v. Ballard, 83 Tex. 486, 18 S.W. 686 (1892) (dicta). There is even Texas
language to the effect that a partner's failure to contribute his promised capital does not
deprive him of the right to share profits, First Nat'l Bank v. Rush, 246 S.W. 349 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1922), although it is hard to see why this is not a material failure of con-
sideration. Cf. Werner v. Mitchell, 2 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism. (profits
recoverable by partner must be reduced by amount he promised but failed to contribute
to partnership).
SBivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 80 S.W.2d 307 (1935).
n Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), error ref. w.o.m.
.17 Partners may agree to share gross proceeds without equalizing their respective outlays
and expenses. See Whitis v. Polk, 36 Tex. 602 (1872).
"' The earliest Texas discussion suggests-misleadingly in light of later law-that the
partner's joint ownership of the asset is the basis for sharing expenses or losses in respect
of it. Id. at 623.
"0 Johnston v. S;eele, 107 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). The same argument, in the
event of a gain, shows that the gain belongs entirely to X. Hatzfield v. Walsh, 120 S.W.
525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref. The incompatibility of the gain argument with the
profit sharing purposes of partnership suggests the invalidity of the loss argument.
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in it if it is impaired (sold unprofitably)."'° The weakness of this
argument is that the co-partners would not share in the asset even
if its "property" had been contributed to the partnership." '
The question whether the partnership had the "property" or
merely the "use" of an asset may arise if the asset was once owned
individually by X or if it was purchased with funds furnished by
him. The answer is complicated by the legal doubt which character-
izes the ownership of realty by a partnership and the normal in-
formality which characterizes the handling of personalty by close
associates. The courts attempt to answer the question by inferring
the intent of the partners as to whether the asset was to be part-
nership property.' If the asset is of the kind normally traded or
consumed by the partnership, there is some reason to assume that
putting it at the disposal of the partnership was an act intended
to make it partnership property.' This view does not prevent
assets of a different kind from becoming partnership property if
the requisite intent can be found; the presumption of firm owner-
ship is, however, weaker. Evidence of intent may be found in the
terms of the partnership agreement, in the way the asset is treated
on partnership records and financial statements, or in the behavior of
the partners with respect to it.
Besides the "use" theory, the "labor" theory needs to be con-
sidered. It often happens that while X has contributed assets to the
partnership, his co-partner Y has furnished only labor."4 Y then
has the additional argument that his labor counterbalances X's
assets as a contribution to the partnership; Y suffers the loss of
his labor just as much as X suffers the loss of his assets; therefore
20 Masterson v. Allen, 29 S.W.2d 539, 542-43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
521 See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
122 Johnston v. Steele, 107 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), as explained in Paggi v.
Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m. (construing written
contract). The question is not, of course, peculiar to Texas; see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1009
(1956). A similar question arises in connection with the distribution of assests on dissolu-
tion and with conflicting priorities of individual and partnership creditors. The determina-
tion is one of fact, reached in the same general way described in the text. See Murrell v.
Mandelbaum, 85 Tex. 22, 19 S.W. 880 (1892) (land belonged to partnership, not to
partners as tenants in common, when it was acquired during partnership and in partner-
ship name and "was regarded by them as a part of the partnership stock"), Luck v.
Hopkins, 54 S.W. 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref. (mill property belonged to
partnership when it was used and operated to carry on the partnership business, was
bought with a view to this purpose, and was paid for by profits arising from the part-
nership).
"' Cf. Bradford v. Bradford, 172 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (property con-
sumed); Bivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 152-53, 80 S.W.2d 307, 315 (1935).
1 The related question of compensation for services and interest on capital is discussed
in notes 156-76 infra and accompanying text.
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neither should contribute to the other's loss."' This theory affords
no guidance if the loss exceeds X's asset contribution. Moreover,
the reasoning is specious if value is gauged by future earning power:
that of X's asset is lost with the asset, that of Y's labor continues
as a personal capacity. It is not wholly unreasonable, of course, to
conclude that no sharing of losses is intended if one partner fur-
nishes all of the assets and the other all of the labor. However,
such a conclusion conflicts with the fundamental "community of
interests" principle and should be reached only by way of a factual
finding of partners' intent 2  and not by legal generalization.
The leading Texas case".. has impliedly recognized the validity
of both the "use" and the "labor" theories. It suggests that the
first will apply only to fixed assets". and the second only if there
is an affirmative agreement," ' and that the courts will be reluctant
to accept either."' These two theories constitute exceptions to the
general rule that partners must share all losses, which is the logical
derivation of the "community of interests" that entitles each to
share profits'3' and makes each fully liable to third persons.""
Most often the "use" and "labor" theories are mentioned when
the asset which is disposed of at a loss is "capital" in the sense of
a fixed asset, as distinguished from inventory."' Texas courts have
not voiced precisely this idea but it seems to underly their concern
with whether the loss is of partnership "capital"; here "capital" ap-
"'Bivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 139-40, 145, 80 S.W.2d 307, 308, 311 (1935). See
also Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref., applying the
"labor" theory where only the "use" of the asset (money) was contributed by X. The first
of these cases speaks of Y's labor as a contribution to partnership "capital" despite the
complete contradiction in terms. Insofar as the "labor" theory tends to limit a partner's
loss to his economic contribution, it is echoed in the federal tax provisions employing a
partner's basis as the limit on deductibility of his share of partnership losses. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, SS 704(d), 705(a), 722, 752(a).
..
6 Cf. Simpson v. Fulcher, 45 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref. (agreement
to share profits; jury finding of no joint ownership of goats supported holding that there
was no obligation to share loss on sale of goats).
'"Bivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 80 S.W.2d 307 (1935).
'281d. at 152-53, 80 S.W.2d at 315.
129 Id. at 145, 80 S.W.2d at 311.
"3°Ibid; accord, Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.
w.o.m.
.' Bivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 80 S.W.2d 137 (1935); Paggi v. Quinn, supra
note 130.
"'A third person may recover against any or all of the partners regardless of the agree-
ment among the partners as to sharing of losses. Miller v. Marx, 65 Tex. 131 (1885) (void
agreement; Asch v. First Nat'l Bank, 304 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.; Davis v. Gilmore, 244 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. (no agree-
ment as to sharing losses); Sturdevant v. Hooper, 101 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
error dism. (one partner to bear all losses).
"3 Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 1221.
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parently has the connotation of property owned by the partnership
and used (but not traded) in its business." '
2. Losses of a General Nature
Similar problems may be encountered if the loss is not associated
with any particular asset. Here the loss is of X's capital in that
the value of partnership assets has been reduced below the value
of X's "capital" contribution to the partnership, thereby making
it impossible for him to recover his "capital."
The "labor" theory would appear to merit the same scope here
that it has with respect to losses on the disposition of a particular
asset; but, surprisingly, the "use" theory appears again in this con-
text by way of dictum in one case"5 and a possible holding in an-
other"s' that a loss of money need not be shared since the partnership
had only the "use" of the money. In the former case the "use"
theory was distinguished factually, not repudiated doctrinally; in
the latter case it was recited enthusiastically. Thus it appears to
have sufficient currency to warrant examination of its two serious
defects. First, aside from physical destruction, it cannot be said
that this particular money was lost. It was merely paid out for
debts and expenses of the partnership. A loss in these circum-
stances is simply a negative income unrelated to any specific asset.
Second, it is difficult to conceive furnishing only the "use" of a
commodity so undifferentiated and labile as money."' If the part-
nership took the money subject to a stronger repayment obligation
than attends a partner's capital contribution, it is hard to see how
the transaction was anything but a loan.' s The responsibility to re-
.. Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
("capital" consisted of lease and equipment, not money furnished by one partner for their
acquisition).
... Paggi v. Quinn, supra note 134 ("use" argued but not proved).
... Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref. The un-
intelligibility of the court's remarks on this point is demonstrated by the following passage
which may constitute an alternative ground for the holding that the asset partner cannot
recover from the labor partner:
Neither could any contribution to the debts the notes were claimed to evidence be
required of the appellee under any other form, because, as presaged supra, they were all
(if in fact any by the partnership) indisputably, if not undisputedly, shown from both
the pleadings and the proof to have been losses only of the moneys as capital that were
wholly-under the specific conditions already shown-furnished by the appellant alone,
wherefore his sole partner, having never owned any individual interest therein, could
not be held for the replacement thereof, he only, by well-settled authority, having to
bear the total loss.
137 Crane, Partnership S 65 (2d ed. 1952) offers the additional observations that great
disparities are unusual but controllable by agreement, and that labor partners are generally
execution proof.
's Note, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 508, 511-12 (1924).
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pay the loan would not be diminished because of unprofitable use
of the loan proceeds. At worst, X would lose his right to collect
from his co-partners because of defective pleadings (e.g., alleging
loss rather than loan) which could not be amended.
The most logical device for relieving the co-partners would be
an implied agreement by X not to seek repayment (except from
partnership profits or assets) for the money he furnished.'' Such
an argument, as we have already suggested, might be strengthened
by the fact that X's co-partners contributed only labor to the part-
nership. Affirmative proof of the agreement would be required of
the co-partners in any event.
Although the general rule of loss sharing in Texas is clear, the
"use" and "labor" exceptions are not. Some of the confusion can
be laid to the garrulity of the courts in pronouncing needless dicta.
The rest is attributable to the "single-shot" character of the early
partnership, typical of a farm-and-ranch economy. Land was to be
cultivated or livestock fattened; one man furnished the assets, the
other the labor. Settlement was made when the crops or cattle were
sold; advances and expenses were repaid and the remainder divided
as profits. All outlays were, in effect, capitalized as asset costs.
There were no liquid funds in the partnership, no concept of the
continuous flow of income and expense. There were no periodic
reckonings and thus no occasion for interim distribution of profits
or contributions to losses.14' Capital was regarded as an object rather
than a measure. Profit was understood as existing apart from assets
(i.e., after the assets were disposed of above cost). Loss was under-
stood only as the impairment of an asset capital (i.e., sale below
cost), not as a negative profit. Thus the loss was the responsibility
of the asset owner, not of the profit sharer. A probable sympathy
for the laborer over the capitalist confirmed the result.
Eventually the realization dawned that a loss is the result of an
historical process, not of an isolated transaction. This may be sensed
in the statement that a loss of capital is to be shared in the same
way as if the loss "had ...not reached the capital, but had simply
diminished the profits.' ' 1 . To complete the present discussion of
... Cf. Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789, 794-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
140 There appear to be no Texas cases dealing with these matters before dissolution. Else-
where, the common law is that the timing of distributions and contributions is to be decided
by majority vote of the partners. Crane, Partnership S 65, especially n.11 (2d ed. 1952).
... Bivins v. Proctor, 125 Tex. 137, 152, 80 S.W.2d 307, 314 (1935), quoting from
Bates, Partnership S 813, at 859 (1888).
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losses,"' it will suffice to note that "capital" is repaid before profits
are distributed.' If the capital is impaired (which means there
are no profits), whatever capital (i.e., asset capital) exists is shared
by the partners not necessarily equally but in proportion to their
capital contributions.'" The partners may, of course, provide other-
wise."" Regardless of capital impairment, the order of distribution
will be the same whether the partnership had the "property" or
only the "use" of a particular asset. If it had the "property," the
value of the asset increased the contributing partner's capital ac-
count and hence his dissolution priority. If it had only the "use,"
the asset remained his throughout."'
3. The Act's Treatment of Profits, Losses, and Capital
The act codifies the general rules prevailing in Texas but does
away with the questionable exceptions. Section 18(a) provides for
sharing profits equally and losses in proportion to profits. This spe-
cifically applies to losses "whether of capital or otherwise"; the
exact nature of "capital" is not in issue since it does not serve as a
limitation. The Texas "labor" exception could not arise under the
act. The "use" exception might enter via an argument that a loss
on disposition of a particular asset was not "sustained by the part-
nership" since the partnership had only the "use" of the asset. No
trace of this exception has been found in cases under the act, and
it is unlikely that it would appear in view of the act's broad defi-
nition of partnership property."' There is no justification in the
act for the "use" exception applied to losses unconnected with
specific assets.
... The order of distribution on dissolution will be treated later in notes 281-82 infra
and accompanying text.
14"But cf. Bradford v. Bradford, 172 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ("[T]he
law will not imply a promise by a co-partner to repay advancements of capital during the
continuance or at the dissolution of the partnership.").
'"Newman v. Newman, 145 Tex. 433, 435, 198 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1947), relying on
Johnston v. Ballard, 83 Tex. 486, 18 S.W. 686 (1892). Cf. Butler v. Thomasson, 256
S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) ("[Als a general rule each partner, upon dis-
solution . . . is entitled to share in the assets and liabilities in proportion to his in-
vestment.").
14 See Fromme v. West, 226 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. (jury found
contract by F to give W a half interest in crops and cattle in exchange for W's labor;
court construed as interest in "profits" but affirmed recovery for W measured by gross
value of the assets themselves). See also Whitis v. Polk, 36 Tex. 602 (1872) (agreement by
P and W to share gross proceeds of cotton furnished by P to be marketed by W implies
that they are joint owners of the cotton).
... The contrary dictum in Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539, 542-43 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) error ref., must be regarded as invalid.
147§ 8(1), (2). Cf. Adams v. Silfen, 337 I11. App. 654, 86 N.E.2d 288 (1949)
(patents developed by partner D at partnership expense were "partnership asset" not re-
coverable by D as his contribution to partnership).
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The act makes it clear that a partner is entitled to recover his
capital contributions and advances before the surplus is shared. This
is at variance with some dicta but in accord with the Texas hold-
ings. In particular, under the act, liabilities to partners must be satis-
fied before capital contributions and advances are repaid. Liabilities
would seem to include advances, although this is not clear. Texas law
on the point is vague, even failing to distinguish between liabilities
and capital contributions."'
Like the Texas cases, the act is silent as to when (other than at
dissolution) profits and losses are to be shared.
B. Indemnity and Contribution
Texas recognizes the right of a partner to contribution from
his co-partners when he pays more than his share of a partnership
obligation.'' The right is based on a promise implied in law.' 0 Con-
tribution in this sense is to be distinguished from the contribution
a partner may expressly agree to make to partnership capital. It
is also to be distinguished, less clearly, from the contribution a part-
ner makes when he shares in partnership losses."' In the latter case,
the economic result will be the same to the extent that the payment
contributed to was one which entered into the computation of the
loss. The obligation to share losses would not, however, be diminished
by making the payments from partnership property, although this
would give no contribution right in the sense here used. On the
other hand, contribution might be required for a payment which
did not increase the loss, e.g., the advantageous purchase of an asset
for the partnership.
The best explanation of the contribution right is that a partner
who pays more than his share of a partnership obligation becomes
a creditor of the partnership for the excess and is thus entitled to
collect from it or the co-partners. 2
The Texas right of contribution corresponds to the right of in-
demnity under the act.' The word "indemnity" in the act is pre-
ferable because it avoids the multiple meanings of "contribution."
14 Cf. M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct.
1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 838, 7 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Ist Dep't 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 804,
24 N.E.2d 482 (1939) (capital, as distinguished from advances, was intended to be at risk
of partnership business).
14 9Hoxie v. Farmers Bank, 49 S.W. 637, 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.
110 Ibid.
151 See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
.5 Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.;




The act is perhaps broader in covering liabilities incurred as well
as payments made, while Texas apparently has considered solely the
latter."4
Texas cases deal with contribution only as of the time of dissolu-
tion, although logically the right arises immediately upon payment.
Like other rights for money growing out of the partnership rela-
tion, it cannot be enforced until the final accounting. The act is
silent on the timing of the indemnity right.
The act's inclusion of payments for the preservation of partner-
ship business or property (in addition to payments in the ordinary
course of its business) probably represents no extension of Texas
law, which has not, however, been explicit on this point. '3
C. Compensation for Services, Money, and Property
A partner's share of the profits is his compensation for services.'
He is entitled to the profits even though he fails to perform the
services promised by him,' s although he may be liable for dam-
ages.' s Without a specific agreement 9 he is not entitled to any
other compensation for his services,' ° even though there are no
profits to share.' or he rendered extra services because his co-part-
ners failed to fulfill their service obligations.' The reason has been
offered that each partner is a principal rather than an employee;' " '
more cogently, it is that one kind of compensation will not be in-
ferred where another (profit sharing) has been expressed.
Several variations from these principles must be noted. An early
Supreme Court decision affirmed an arbitration award which in-
..
4 Hoxie v. Farmers Bank, 49 S.W. 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref. (suggestion
that the right arises when the partner pays the judgment against him for a partnership debt,
not when the judgment is entered).
... Cf. Moss & Urschel v. Clark, 82 S.W.2d 1090, 1093 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error
ref. (contribution for payment "necessary in the development, protection and operation"
of the partnership oil and gas lease).
"'Montgomery v. Burch, 11 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
... This is the implication of cases like Wilson v. Hunt, 270 S.W. 263 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925), holding that the co-partner is not entitled to anything more than his own share of
the profits. Cf. Bauer v. Crow, 110 Tex. 538, 221 S.W. 936 (1920) (no services called
for, profits shared).
.S. Fithel v. Saltes, 11 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref. (absent partner
charged with cost of hiring employee to do his job).
... For an example of a valid, specific salary agreement, see Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W.
209 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
'"Butler v. Thomasson, 256 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
... Johnston v. Steele, 107 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
... Fithel v. Saltes, 11 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref. (co-partner absent
because of illness); Wilson v. Hunt, 270 S.W. 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (co-partner's
failure to perform not explained).




cluded an allowance to a farming partner for his services. Distin-
guishing a trade or professional partnership (to which each partner
is presumed to devote his time and attention), the Court said:
It [the partnership in question] only embraced the purchase and run-
ning of a farm; and if one partner in such case should, at the instance
of the other, devote his time and attention to the farm, while the other
was devoting his attention to his individual business, we have no doubt
but that the law would imply a promise that the former should have
compensation for his services."'
Quite apart from the oblique language and the absence of citation,
this decision is weak in logic. The disparity of services (particularly
since normal in the business) would naturally have been taken in-
to account in determining the division of profits."5 Nonetheless, the
decision appears still to stand. Its only important application has
been in a more compelling situation where a partner was allowed
a salary for services expected to be performed by hired help."' In
both cases the non-labor partner was concerned with his individual
affairs and in some way asked or agreed that his co-partner do all
the partnership work. In the latter case, however, the need for one
partner to do all the work was not anticipated while in the former
it was. Therefore, a supplemental, implied contract is justifiable
in the more recent case but not in the older one where the original
contract (for profit sharing) should have been decisive.' s
One other exception to the general rule allows compensation for
services by a partner when his co-partner "abandoned the partner-
ship before its affairs were wound up" and the partner "was forced
to render services to the partnership not contemplated by the part-
nership agreement.".1 . To reconcile the exception with the general
rule, it must be inferred that abandonment is something more serious
'"Hooker v. Williamson, 60 Tex. 524, 527 (1883). The case is discussed here in some
detail since, through the vagaries of head-noting, it has eluded Texas Digest and Texas
jurisprudence. Another early case said a partner could recover the value of his services
(constructing a plant to be operated by the partnership) when he was "expelled" from the
partnership on completion of the construction. Ball v. Britton, 59 Tex. 57 (1882). A dis-
solution rationale is used: the partner should be able to withdraw the property equivalent of
his services contribution.
" It may be economically unrealistic to assume that a labor partner has the same bar-
gaining power as an asset partner, but this is implicitly done in ruling that the labor part-
ner shares "capital" losses without an express agreement to the contrary, notes 131-32 supra
and accompanying text.
.. Montgomery v. Burch, 11 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
"" It may be argued that, in the latter case, the absence of an employee should have been
anticipated just as it is presumed that the absence of a partner should have been anticipated
in setting the profit shares. The answer, of course, is that replacement by a partner is
natural in a partner's absence but not in an employee's.
"" Siler v. Barber, 29 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.
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than failure to perform services (which would not justify compen-
sation for the other partner), or that voluntary failure to perform
(as distinguished from involuntary) is not contemplated at the
formation of the partnership agreement, or that services in wind-
ing up are treated differently from services in the continuation of
the business (although they are certainly as natural and foreseeable).
The act'" comports generally with the Texas cases disallowing
compensation for a partner's services. It would establish the rule
suggested in one case" ' that compensation is allowable to the partner
who winds up. Although the act purports to deny remuneration in
all other cases, it is subordinate to agreements among the partners.
Thus, it would be possible, though not necessarily desirable, to reach
the same results under the act as under the Texas decisions on im-
plied agreements."
It is normally reasoned that profit sharing compensates for the
furnishing of capital just as it does for the furnishing of services.
Consequently, without an express agreement to the contrary, no
interest is due a partner on his capital in the firm.'' Interest is allow-
ed from the time an accounting is completed and repayment of the
capital is due,' but this is for delay in the payment of a matured
debt, not for use of the capital in the business. One case allowed in-
terest where there was no express agreement for it but it was found
(on unstated criteria) that the capital contributions were in effect
loans."
The act is perfectly clear: a partner is entitled to interest on his
capital only from the date repayment should be made.'
There is little Texas authority on the right of a partner to re-
ceive rent for property he supplies for partnership use. It would
seem that his share of profits would be the only compensation owing
to him. One case has, however, granted rent based on an implied
contract.'' Nothing in the act purports to deal with this problem.
"' § 18 (f).
'*"Siler v. Barber, 29 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.
'"Hooker v. Williamson, 60 Tex. $24 (1883); Montgomery v. Burch, 11 S.W.2d 545
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
12 McKay v. Overton, 65 Tex. 82 (1885); Jones v. Mitchell, 47 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) error ref.
.7. Ibid. Cf. Corralitos Co. v. MacKay, 72 S.W. 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) error ref.
(interest allowed where accounting delayed by fraud or misconduct).
'"'Reese v. Carey Bros., 286 S.W. 307, 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism. Cf.
Giddings v. Harding, 267 S.W. 976 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925) (interest paid by partner to
third person on sums borrowed by partner to purchase cattle for partnership was allowed as
a partnership expense, thereby paid to partner).
17 5 18 (d).
'"'Meier v. Murphy, 207 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.c.
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The act's chief contribution to the treatment of compensation is
to focus attention on the profit-sharing agreement as the primary
means of remuneration and to discourage implied supplementary
agreements.
D. Management
In Texas, each partner has the right to share in the management
of the firm affairs."' Control- normally rests in the majority,"' but
it may be delegated, e.g., to a managing partner.' The act is en-
tirely in accord.' s
E. Delectus Personae
In the only Texas case... dealing with the phrase, delectus personae
has been described as the right of the partners to select their co-
partners. In particular, this means that no person can become a
member of a partnership without the unanimous consent of the
existing partners. 8' It is in this form that the act lays down the
rule. 8 '
F. Fiduciary Relations
Texas cases recognize the fiduciary aspect of partners' relations
with one another, growing out of their intimate association, essen-
tial dependence, and mutual confidence. They may not deal with
each other at arms length, but must voluntarily disclose all infor-
mation relevant to the partnership,'84 e.g., concerning the value of
its property.' s A partner who acquires property for his own benefit,
'".Rische v. Rische, 101 S.W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error dism. (refusal to allow
participation in management is sufficient ground for decree of dissolution and receivership).
" Oil Lease & Royalty Syndicate v. Beeler, 217 S.W. 1054, 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
error ref. (dictum).
.. Ibid. Cf. Texas Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Bass, 137 Tex. 1, 151
S.W.2d 567 (1941) (partnerships with majority partners in common were not "controlled
. . . by the same interest" because they had separate managing partners; consequently, they
were not to be treated as a single partnership for unemployment compensation purposes).
For an example of extensive powers of a managing partner, see Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W.
209 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
"0 S 18(e), (h). Nothing has been found in the Texas cases to correspond to the last
clause of S 18(h), but it is entirely consistent with other phases of the Texas law.
1s1 Johnston v. Winn, 105 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
... Ibid.
183S 18 (g).
' Cf. Pappas v. Gounaris, 301 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), reformed and
aff'd, -Tex.-, 311 S.W.2d 644 (1958) (duty to disclose homestead claim in property
contributed to partnership).
1" Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 120 S.W.2d 786 (1938) (negotiation by partner
to sell for higher price than he was paying co-partner for his interest; sale between partners
must be for fair consideration and on full disclosure); Inman v. Parr, 311 S.W.2d 658,
701-02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (periodic statements of profits and net worth of automobile
[Vol. 12
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adverse to the partnership interests and without his co-partners'
consent, holds the property in trust for the partnership."8 The re-
sult is similar if he misappropriates partnership property. 7 Where
he withholds property due the partnership, the judiciary has held
him liable but not on trust principles. 8 There are decisions to the
effect that surviving partners hold money collected upon partner-
ship claims in trust for the partnership, and must account to the
deceased partner's representative for his share. 8
In this province, as the Commissioners noted,"' the act.. does
little more than clarify doubt, specifying that a partner holds as
trustee "any profits" improperly derived by him. By contrast, using
no "trustee" language, the act says that a partner must account for
"any benefit" (as distinguished from "any profits"). It is hard to
believe that any lesser standard was intended for something that
might represent a benefit but not a profit, e.g., misappropriated
partnership property. The solution may lie in a generous definition
dealership); Rodgers v. Tracy, 242 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
(newly developed geological interest in "deep rights"); Perpetual Royalty Syndicate v.
Albritton, 149 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism., judgm. cor. Cf. Armstrong
v. Simms, 132 S.W. 500, 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), which suggests that there is no af-
firmative duty to disclose, only a duty not to deceive.
186 Wampler v. Harrington, 261 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error dism. What is
"adverse" for this purpose remains to be defined by the Texas courts. In this case it ap-
pears merely that the lease acquired by one partner individually was of the kind sometimes
acquired by the partnership. Cf. MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334
(1944); the decision is not on partnership grounds, but the adverseness is clear: M individ-
ually obtained renewal of an overriding royalty formerly held jointly by him and F. See
also Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486, 271 S.W.2d 93 (1954), holding that a managing partner
held in trust for the partnership an oil and gas lease on land previously leased to the part-
nership if he was in fiduciary relationship when he individually obtained the later lease.
Although it was found on remand that a fiduciary relationship did exist, 294 S.W.2d 280
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e., it is not clear what criteria were used. The central
issue, quite properly, seems to have been whether the partnership still existed when the new
lease was made, but there is a suggestion that the fiduciary relationship is independent of
the partnership. Cf. Collins v. Gee, 107 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref., where
property owned by G and associates was foreclosed by their agreement with the mortgagee;
later G bought the property for substantially less than the mortgage debt. It was held that
G had no obligation to share the property with the associates since they had voluntarily
parted with it to relieve themselves of the mortgage debt and had completely terminated
the association.
187 Cook v. Barrier, 73 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (partner used partnership
funds for individual speculation in cotton); Pfeuffer v. Haas, 55 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) error dism. (partner allowed employee to use partnership funds to pay em-
ployee's debts); Smith v. Green, 243 S.W. 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref. (partner
tused partnership funds to improve his homestead).
.. Collins v. Dawson, 54 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism. (commission
on stock sale for which partnership was broker).
... Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin, 82 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dism.;
Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Harrell, 159 S.W. 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.
Commissioners' Note to 5 21.
181 § 21.
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of "profit," which the courts of Texas would undoubtedly give in
preservation of existing case law applying trust principles.'
The act's broad inclusion of "profits ...connected with the for-
mation, conduct or liquidation" of the partnership, extends trust
principles to the "twilight" zones before and after the actual opera-
tion of the partnership business.' The statutory trust would en-
able the partnership to regain intact money or property held by a
partner despite insolvency or the statute of limitations. The act
also imposes a duty to render information on demand of a co-part-
ner. " This is weaker than the Texas duty to render information
without demand (e.g., in trading with a co-partner) but the latter
would surely persist as a corollary of the fiduciary character of
partners under the act.'
G. Books and Records; Formal Accounts
Texas courts have stated that it is the duty of a managing partner
to keep accurate records of his transactions.' Apparently, nothing
has been said about the record-keeping requirements where there is
no managing partner; presumably, each partner should record his
partnership transactions or report them to the bookkeeping part-
ner or clerk. The act specifies that the books shall be at the prin-
cipal place of business;9 as to record-keeping, it requires only that
partners shall render full information on demand.' A partner's
right to inspect the books is recognized in Texas' and the act. '
192 See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
1" See, e.g., White v. McNeil, 294 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), in which M agreed
to become W's partner and to convey to him a half interest in certain leases to be used in
the partnership. Two days later M advised that he would not perform. W sued for his half
interest in the leases. Dismissal on M's general exceptions was affirmed on the ground that
the leases had never become partnership property and the agreement to convey was unen-
forceable since unwritten. Except possibly for the statute of frauds question, the result
would be contrary under the act. The act would produce the same result as McLean, v.
Hargrove, 139 Tex. 236, 162 S.W.2d 954 (1942), holding that a surviving partner, despite
his authority to wind up, was a constructive trustee for partnership property which he in-
dividually purchased below actual value at a post-dissolution foreclosure sale which he could
have prevented.
1"4 5 20.
'.. Cf. Poss v. Gottlieb, 118 Misc. 319, 193 N.Y.S. 413 (1st Dep't 1922) (partner
should abstain from all concealment).
.. Saunders v. Duval's Adm'r, 19 Tex. 467, 472 (1857); Newman v. Newman, 195
S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), aff'd, 145 Tex. 433, 198 S.W.2d 91 (1946);
Cook v. Peacock, 154 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.; Dial v. Martin,
37 S.W.2d 166, 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 57 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1933). Some aspects are effectively determined by federal tax law, e.g., fiscal
year and segregation of certain accounts. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §5 706, 702.
1, 5 19.
1985 20.
19 Rush v. Browning, 103 Tex. 649, 132 S.W. 763 (1910); Saunders v. Duval's Adm'r,




A formal account or (as it is sometimes called) an accounting
is more than a presentation of financial statements. It encompasses
a review of all transactions, including alleged improprieties, which
should be reflected in the financial statements.
Texas cases seem to recognize a partner's right to an accounting
at dissolution but not before.2"' If the partnership agreement called
for periodic accounting, a Texas court would probably enforce it,
but there are no cases in point. The act therefore represents an ad-
vance in allowing a partner a formal account where the right to it
exists under the terms of any agreements."' The act is also explicit
in granting an accounting to a partner who is wrongfully excluded
or whose co-partner violates fiduciary obligations or withholds
money."' Texas would probably reach the same result in these events
by treating them as grounds for dissolution which would be followed
by an accounting."4 In these and any other circumstances rendering
an accounting "just and reasonable" the act provides it without
dissolution."" The act's procedure should be speedier and less in-
jurious to the partnership whose affairs are incomplete or which is
to last for a fixed term.
IV. DISSOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP
The Uniform Partnership Act offers major improvements over
Texas case law in the treatment of dissolution. The first of these is
a clarification of terminology. Texas does not distinguish the time
when the partners cease to go forward as full-fledged associates and
the end of the wind-up period that follows. Judges have applied
"termination" and "dissolution" indiscriminately to both situations,
thus failing to differentiate a change in legal status from the com-
pletion of an economic activity. The confusion of thought that
results from this confusion of language is avoidable under the act,
which defines dissolution as the change in relations caused by any
partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business,
as distinct from its winding up."' The act specifies that a partner-
201 See, e.g., the language in Miller v. Howell, 234 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950),
at 930: "When a partnership business is closed out, a cause of action for an account-
ing arises between the partners . ... "
202 22 (b). Failure to furnish such an account may be grounds for dissolution under
S 32(1) (d).
20§22(a), (c).
"04 Such events would also be causes of dissolution under the act. Herslof v. Sharpe, 249
Wis. 600, 24 N.W.2d 600 (1946).
2' 22(a), (c), (d). Morris v. Duke, 175 Md. 300, 2 A.2d 11 (1938).
2'" 29.
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ship continues after dissolution until the winding up is com-
pleted."7 Then it terminates."8
These rules of the act greatly simplify solution of such questions
as who shares in post-dissolution profits or which partners may
be held liable on obligations incurred after dissolution.
A. Causes of Dissolution"'5
A partnership is a fragile thing; its essential community of in-
terests is easily destroyed. Dissolution may happen in a variety of
ways. For example, both the act and Texas decisions recognize that
death of a partner"'° and absence of profit prospect 1' dissolve the
partnership or justify dissolution.
Other causes of dissolution in the act appear to be consonant with
Texas principles but have no exact parallel in the cases. These in-
clude completion of the term or undertaking specified in the part-
nership agreement,21' supervening illegality or (upon judicial de-
termination under the act) lunacy or other incapacity,"' and bank-
ruptcy or insolvency.1 4
207 S 30.
208 Commissioners' Note to S 29.
20" Until recently, a vexatious question was what constituted dissolution or termination
for federal income tax purposes, especially with respect to death of a partner or sale of a
partnership interest. See Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 1183, 1196 (1954). The tax law now provides that a partnership con-
tinues unless no part of its business is carried on in a partnership or a 50% interest changes
hands within a year. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 708.
... S 31(4). Martin v. Dial, 57 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). It should be not-
ed that Texas dicta indicate that a partnership may continue despite the death of a partner,
if there is a specific agreement to this effect. Alexander's Ex'rs v. Lewis, 47 Tex. 481 (1877).
See Comment, Partnership Agreement Disposing of Property After Death, 7 Baylor L. Rev.
291 (1955). This case, and most subsequent authorities, express doubt whether there is
technically a continuation of the old partnership in these circumstances, or the formation
of a new one. The act provides for a clear continuation of creditors' rights in such circum-
stances. 5 41.
211 Section 32 (1) (e) requires a court determination. Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e. (dictum; case holds that plaintiff partner cannot
bobtain dissolution on this ground where jury has found that profits are possible but for his
interference).
212 5 31(1) (a). Cf. Trigg v. Shelton, 249 S.W. 209 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) (agree-
ment validly gave one partner the right to dissolve at any time). Section 23 provides that a
continuation of the partnership business by the active partners after completion of the
specified term or undertaking creates a partnership at will otherwise subject to the original
agreement.
213 S 32(3). Cf. King v. Matney, 259 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
(marriage of female partner dissolves).
24 SS 31(5), 2. These provisions cover bankruptcy (i.e., adjudication under National
Bankruptcy Act S 1(2) and 1 (8)) of the partnership or of any partner. Texas law has
not reached this degree of refinement; the only discovered case states that bankruptcy of a
partner dissolves the partnership. Daugherty v. Jacob Strauss & Co., 1 White & Willson 508
(Tex. Comm'rs of App. 1880). The same sections of the Uniform Partnership Act provide
dissolution when the partnership or any partner is insolvent under a state insolvency act.
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Still other causes of dissolution included in the act must be
regarded as potential modifications of Texas law since there is in-
sufficient background to predict how a Texas court would rule:
expulsion of a partner pursuant to a power contained in the part-
nership agreement," 5 or a judicial determination that a partner
has wilfully or persistently breached the partnership agreement or
that his conduct tends "to affect prejudicially" or makes "not rea-
sonably practicable" the carrying on of the partnership business." '
Under Texas law, a partner's sale of his interest in the partnership
or in partnership property effects a dissolution." ' As already dis-
cussed, the act would make a welcome change by ruling that such
a transfer does not, in itself, bring about dissolution." ' The trans-
feree could dissolve if the partnership had completed its term or
undertaking, or was a partnership at will,"1 ' but could not other-
The general Texas test of insolvency is the equity test: inability to pay debts as they mature.
24A Tex. Jur., Insolvency 530 n.9 (1956) and cases there cited. But Texas has no in-
solvency statute in force. Nor is it even clear in Texas law how the insolvency test would
be applied to a partnership, that is, whether only partnership ability to pay debts would be
considered, or whether the partners' individual abilities to pay partnership debts would be
taken into account in consequence of their unlimited liabilities. The latter would probably
be the Texas ruling, since it is consistent with the local interpretation of a partnership as a
contractual aggregation of individuals rather than a separate legal entity. Nonetheless, one
can not say with certainty that a Texas partnership could be insolvent while it still had a
solvent member.
This doubt is one of several factors encouraging the use of federal bankruptcy pro-
cedures in the disposition of Texas partnerships. By federal standards, insolvency is
measured from the balance sheet by determining whether the debts exceed the assets at a
fair value. Assets of a partnership include the excess, if any, of each partner's individual
assets over his individual debts. (Cases are collected in 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 698-99, Para.
5.06 nn.1-4 (14th ed. 1956, Supp. 1957)). Conversely, in determining whether an individual
partner is insolvent, his assets are deemed to include his share of the partnership assets in
excess of partnership debts. Thus, entity principles are applied to the extent of preserving
the priority of individual creditors in individual assets and of partnership creditors in
partnership assets. But aggregate principles are applied secondarily so that a partnership will
never be insolvent for bankruptcy purposes if it has a solvent partner.
The Uniform Partnership Act resembles the bankruptcy law in counting as partnership
assets the contributions which partners are required to make in order to satisfy partnership
liabilities. § 40(a) (II).
Determining, under the bankruptcy act, that a partner or partnership is bankrupt in-
volves many complications into which we cannot enter here. Primary among these is what
constitutes an act of bankruptcy by a partnership, especially in respect of a fraudulent or
preferential transfer. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 696-98 (14th ed. 1956); Crane, Partner-
ship S 91 (2d ed. 1952).
215S 31(1)(d). The novelty is that the act specifies that such a dissolution is not in
violation of the agreement, an entirely reasonable view. The only remotely relevant
authority seems to be Rische v. Rische, 101 S.W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error dism.
w.o.j., in which a receivership was granted at the instance of a partner who had been ex-
cluded from the partnership; the exclusion was not pursuant to any agreement.
s"6§ 32(1) (c), (d).
21 Note 55 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Neal v. Adkins, 145 S.W. 264 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912) (admission of new partner creates new partnership).
218 27(1). See discussion in notes 66, 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
h19 32(2).
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wise interfere or participate in the partnership. ' The remaining
partners could obtain a dissolution decree if their co-partner's trans-
fer constituted a wilful breach of the partnership agreement."'
The act affords flexibility and preserves local custom by provid-
ing for dissolution, on court decree, when any circumstances render
a dissolution equitable."2
Probably the most frequently litigated type of dissolution is one
which differs moderately in Texas and the act: dissolution at the will
of a partner. There is no doubt, of course, that all the partners to-
gether may dissolve.2 ' The situation is less clear if fewer than all
want to dissolve.
Texas is committed to the general principle that there are no
indissoluble partnerships; consequently, any partner can dissolve
at any time.2 4 Several limitations on this principle should be men-
tioned although, as typical Texas dicta, they may be more apparent
than real. The rule has been enunciated for partnerships "calling
for the personal services of the partners...2 .. The implication is that
it does not hold for other kinds of partnerships, although nothing
has been found explicitly so stating. Indeed, such a qualification
would not be easy to defend logically; quite apart from the difficulty
of identifying "personal services," there seems no compelling rea-
son to keep partners together against the wish of one of them
merely because their tie is one of money rather than labor. Another
possible stricture on the general rule is the statement that dissolution
at will is available provided it would not injure or defraud the
co-partners."' The short answer to this thought is that protection
against wrongful dissolution can be had by means other than speci-
fic performance, e.g., damages or constructive trust.
Yet other exceptions are stated or suggested in the jurisprudence.
250 27(1).
221S 32(i) (d).112S  3 2(1 ) (f).
32 Cf. Brammer v. Wilder, 122 Tex. 247, 57 S.W.2d 571 (1933). This case also stands
for the proposition that dissolution requires more than expression of intent, i.e., a cessation
of business activity. Assets were retained and extensive enterprises conducted; the Court
said "the facts . . . show as a matter of law that the partnership . . . had not been dis-
solved." Id. at 253, 57 S.W.2d at 573. The act, slightly more flexible, allows dissolution
by all partners who have not transferred their interests or had them subjected to a charging
order. 5 3i(1)(c).
'"McCollum v. McCollum, 67 S.W.2d 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (partnership will
not be continued by injunction).2
2i Id. at 1056.
226 Green v. Waco State Bank, 78 Tex. 2, 214 S.W. 252 (1890) (dictum), paraphrased
in 32 Tex. Jur., Partnership 491 (1934); Gilver v. Graham, 52 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1932) (possible holding, using the language of termination rather than dissolution).
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The partnership agreement may "foreclose the right ... to demand
dissolution. 22. A partnership without a fixed term may be dissolved
at the will of any partner;.. the implication is that a partnership
with a fixed term cannot be so dissolved.
The rationale underlying most of these ideas is a simple one fami-
liar in other areas but not articulated in Texas partnership decisions
until comparatively recently. It is that the right to dissolve differs
from the power to dissolve. The limitations, whether contractual
or equitable, are upon the right, not the power. The distinction
is by no means academic, since dissolution without right may bring
various consequences, notably damages for breach of contract.2 '
The situation is not, however, quite as simple as the power-right
dichotomy suggests. A partner who wants out wants his share of
partnership property. This necessitates an accounting. Particularly
since accounting is historically an equitable proceeding, he may be
met with equitable defenses, e.g., "clean hands," which tend to
hamper the exercise of his power to dissolve. The quandary is illu-
strated in a recent case, Collins v. Lewis. 3
Collins, the financing partner in a large cafeteria venture, sued
for dissolution, apparently on the principal ground that there was
no reasonable expectation of profit. Although the jury found that
there was no such expectation, and although this is normally a valid
reason for dissolution, the trial court held and the appellate court
affirmed that Collins was not entitled to a dissolution decree. The
judgment seems to have rested primarily on a further jury finding
that, but for Collins' interference in the cafeteria management
(from which he was barred by his agreement with Lewis), there
was a reasonable expectation of profit. Just what the jury deemed to
be interference is not stated in the opinion. Presumably it was
Collins' threat and refusal to furnish additional funds for what he
claimed were operating expenses (which he was not obligated to
provide) but which the court found to be equipping costs (which
he was obligated to provide). Other behavior of Collins might well
have been considered interference, even though it pertained to the
227 Shelton v. Trigg, 226 S.W. 761, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), rev'd on other grounds,
249 S.W. 209 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
228 Wright v. Ross, 70 S.W. 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error dism.; Ware v. Chatham,
56 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism.
22. Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.;
McCollum v. McCollum, 67 S.W.2d 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Cf. Butler v. Thomas-
son, 256 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (dissolution "without penalty" possible
at any time unless there is contract to the contrary).
230283 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
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financial arrangements rather than the daily operation of the cafeter-
ia. For example, he caused a bank (of which he was a stockholder and
director) to mature large demand notes, given by Lewis as part of
the transaction but on the understanding from Collins that the
only required payments would be from cafeteria earnings at
a minimum rate guaranteed by Lewis. Collins then attempted to
foreclose the mortgage Lewis had given him on his share of the part-
nership. Thus, Collins and Lewis, now implacable adversaries, are
left in business together although Collins has manifested in the
most emphatic way his desire to get out. The result is undoubtedly
fair in view of Collins' harrassment of Lewis and in view of the
contemplated duration of the project in which profit sharing was to
begin only after profits had been applied to discharge installation
loans which ultimately exceeded $600,000. It appears that Collins
was asking dissolution as of right (i.e., without liability);... this
was correctly denied him since no person should have a right grow-
ing out of his own wrong. The court carefully remarks that the
power of dissolution exists apart from this litigation and mentions
(conspicuously not adopting it) Collins' contention that the right
of dissolution is independent of who is right or wrong in the dis-
pute between the partners. Nonetheless, the reader of the decision
is bound to wonder whether the court would have countenanced
the power of dissolution in the same circumstances in which it was
denying the right. If the legal right "rests on equity '  so must the
exercise of the power. The court's reasoning suits the two situations
equally well.
Collins v. Lewis contains this indisputable observation: "The
proper and equitable solution of the differences which arise between
partners is never an easy problem, especially where the relationship
is as involved as this present one. ' 's
23' The pleadings are not discussed at any length; the court plainly regards them as
seeking dissolution of right. Apparently there was no claim that the partnership was one
at will; this would have been incompatible with the long-term undertaking. The court,
if it saw fit, could have treated the partnership as dissolved by the act of filing the suit.
Cf. Wright v. Ross, 70 S.W. 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error dism. Certainly on the
basis of Collins' acts, Lewis could have obtained a decree of dissolution and damages (for
which he asked in the event Collins was granted dissolution). Note that it is the service
partner (Lewis) asking continuation of the firm; if he were requesting dissolution, he might
invoke the argument that his services should not be compelled by prolongation of the
partnership. There is no good reason why this theory should be used by him more effectively
than against him, for this case dramatically demonstrates the folly of assuming that a non-
service relationship is an impersonal one that can be specifically enforced without disruption
of the enterprise.
23s23 S.W.2d at 261.
133 283 S.W.2d at 263.
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The value of the partnership enterprise lay not merely in its
property but in its continued operation; this required the capital of
Collins and the services of Lewis. The cafeteria could not very well
have been partitioned between them, nor is it likely that it could
readily have been sold at a satisfactory price. The court, conscious
of the difficulty of fashioning a remedy, decided that none was
needed because there had been no dissolution. One may agree with
the result without accepting the logic. The case remains a bulwark
against abuse of the right to dissolve, a threat to the power to
dissolve, and a testimonial to the fine line between right and power.
The Texas distinction between the power and the right to dissolve
is comparable to the act's distinction between dissolution with and
without violation of the partnership agreement. 3 ' If a definite term
or particular undertaking is specified by the partnership agreement,
the express will of any partner can dissolve the partnership, but
only in violation of the agreement (the consequences of which,
far more precise than anything in Texas law, are discussed below).
If there is no definite term or particular undertaking, the express
will of a partner dissolves without violation.
B. Consequences of Dissolution
1. Relations Among the Partners
Texas law is full of gaps in the subject of partners' relations af-
ter dissolution. 3' One of the greatest attractions of the act is its
comprehensiveness in this regard. What there is of Texas law has
evolved in cases of dissolution by death. Of these, Martin v. Dial3'
is authority for all the basic propositions. The surviving partner
134 S 31(2), (1)(b).
.. On the whole, Texas courts have failed to distinguish solvent from insolvent dis-
solutions in terms of either the powers to wind up or the method of distribution. For this
and other reasons, most reported instances of the administration of insolvent partnerships
are under the federal bankruptcy laws. The latter topic, beyond the scope of our Article,
is exhaustively treated in 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 712-43 (14th ed. 1956). See also Crane,
Partnership §§ 92-95 (2d ed. 1952). For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that bank-
ruptcy administration supersedes state and private proceedings and gives a trustee, rather
than the partners, the right to wind up. Moreover, it controls the distribution of property
in such a way as generally to preserve the priority of partnership creditors in partnership
assets, and the priority of individual creditors of a partner in his individual assets. These
distribution rules are essentially the same as those in the Uniform Partnership Act. S
40(b), (i).
236 57 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). The case is not as strong as it might be
since it is not a contest between the survivor and his deceased co-partner's representative
but a cooperation between them against one to whom they transferred property which
later greatly increased in value. Other sources of copious dicta on the consequences of dis-
solution are Smith v. Wayman, 148 Tex. 318, 224 S.W.2d 211 (1949); McLean v. Har-
grove, 139 Tex. 236, 162 S.W.2d 954 (1942).
19 58]
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has the duty and authority to wind up the partnership affairs."' 7
For this purpose he takes equitable title to partnership property,"'
is entitled to exclusive possession of it,' and has the right to sell
it (which, importantly, includes the right to execute oil and gas
leases of it). He may renew debts4 ° or mortgage property to pay
them. And he may bind the estate of the deceased partner to the
extent appropriate and necessary to settle affairs of the firm. His
authority does not lapse with the passage of time, though he may
be compelled to hasten when he is dilatory. All of the foregoing
principles appear to be predicated on the existence of partnership
debts,. 41 although there is no indication whether the debts must
be substantial in relation to the value of the partnership, and no
certainty what happens when the debts are discharged.
If the dissolution is by unanimous agreement, each partner can
engage in the winding up; he remains an agent of his co-partners
for this limited activity. Although he has no authority to under-
take new business for the firm, he is entitled to contribution for
his reasonable expenses in protecting partnership property.4
Will these rules apply in other situations? Do we treat an insol-
vent or rightfully dissolving partner as though he were dead? Is
a wrongfully dissolving partner permitted to participate in the
winding up? Questions of this sort cannot be firmly answered in
the present state of affairs.
The act presents systematic, if somewhat involved, answers to
these and other questions arising in dissolution. The right to wind
up is (subject to any agreement the partners may have made)
S37Accord, Wright v. Campbell, 75 Tex. 644, 13 S.W. 293 (1890) (surviving law
partners may recover from client for services of deceased partner); McLean v. Hargrove,
supra note 236. The partners may by agreement provide for winding up by persons other
than partners, e.g., designated trustees. Smith v. Wayman, supra note 236.
" See also discussion in notes 46, 63, 67 supra, and accompanying text.
ss
9 Cf. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 156 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (receiver will
not be appointed to take partnership property from surviving partner unless shown nec-
essary for preservation of the property). The partners may by agreement provide that title
shall vest in one of them individually, e.g., in consideration for his assumption of debts.
Gaut v. Reed Bros. & Co., 24 Tex. 46 (1859).
240 Contra, White v. Tudor, 24 Tex. 639 (1860).
"" Cf. Donnell v. Talley, 104 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism. by agr.
(surviving partner not entitled to exclusive possession if no debts).
'Compare Donnell v. Talley, supra note 241 (if no debts, partners are tenants in
common) with Newman v. Newman, 195 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), aff'd, 145
Tex. 433, 198 S.W.2d 91 (1947) (partnership property not susceptible of partition in
kind should be sold and the proceeds divided).
2" Jones v. Mitchell, 47 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. (one of three
voluntary assessments paid on bank stock found to be reasonable, hence giving rise to con-
tribution right), discussed note 253 infra. See also Long v. Garnett, 59 Tex. 229, 232
(1883).
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lodged in the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved.' The
malefactor is thus deprived of any right to interfere further in
partnership affairs, but one who dissolves a partnership at will is
allowed to participate in the settlement of affairs. Moreover, any
partner can, upon cause shown, obtain winding up by the court.
This should provide judicial assistance more liberally than it has
been available under the Texas receivership provisions which have
been sparingly applied to partnerships. 4 The right to possession of
244s 37.
2s In a dispute among partners, control of partnership property is almost always an
issue. Often receivership is sought. Article 2293, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1950), pro-
vides that "Receivers may be appointed . . . in the following cases: 1. . . . [B]etween
partners jointly owning or interested in any property or fund, on the application of
the plaintiff or any party whose right to or interest in the property or fund or the pro-
ceeds thereof is probable, and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed or materially injured."
This somewhat confused provision has been construed by the Texas courts in few cases,
with apparently only three sustaining the trial court's appointment of a receiver of part-
nership assets upon a partner's petition. These cases are Hitt v. Morris, 250 S.W.2d 408
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Alexander v. Alexander, 99 S.W.2d 1062 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Holder v. Shelby, 118 S.W. 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909). There have been several cases
concerning receiverships of joint interests in partition suits. See Silva v. C. J. Webster Oil &
Gas Co., 113 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (court refused to appoint a receiver);
Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 583 (1952). To justify a receivership, the applicant must first show
that his interest in the property is probable, i.e., he must make out at least a prima facie
case of joint ownership. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 156 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
After establishing this, he must then sustain the difficult burden of proving that his
interest in the property is in danger of being lost because of neglect or mismanagement
of the business by its manager, or because of the manager's unfitness. Ibid. See also Rogers
v. Rogers, 150 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). The case of Silva v. C. J. Webster
Oil & Gas Co., supra, which involved a joint mineral interest but which was decided
under the same provision of article 2293, held that a mere allegation that personal prop-
erty "might be lost or damaged" (statutory language) is insufficient to justify appoint-
ment of a receiver. The plaintiff apparently must allege mismanagement, neglect, or simi-
lar deficiencies despite the language of this article. Due to the fact that a receivership
of a going business is a drastic remedy, the courts are reluctant to appoint a receiver
except in extreme cases; particularly is this true in ex parte suits under article 2293,
where an applicant will be denied relief except in emergencies of a nature which would
cause material injury to plaintiff if the delay necessary for notice were taken. Head v.
Roberts, 291 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Morris v. Ruegg, 140 S.W.2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
The only provision of the act in which a receivership is authorized is found in 5
28(1) which allows a judgment creditor of a partner to apply to the court which
rendered the judgment for a charging order, after which the same court may appoint
a receiver of the debtor partner's share of the profits and other money due him from the
partnership, or order a sale of the interest charged. It is important to note that this
remedy is available only to a judgment creditor of a partner and apparently only upon
the perfection of a lien, cf. Waples-Platter Co. v. Mitchell, 35 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App.
1895), and not to a partner seeking to protect his interest in dissolution or winding up.
However, the act has been construed by the courts of jurisdictions in which it is in
force not to preclude receiverships of partnership assets in suits for dissolution under
S 32. See, e.g., Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal. App. 2d 187, 229 P.2d 89 (1951); Dolenga
v. Lipka, 224 Mich. 276, 195 N.W. 90 (1923); Heisler v. Heisler, 85 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1948). In view of S 32 and its construction by the courts of other states, Texas'
adoption of the act would apparently only supplement our present law so far as re-
ceiverships are concerned. The act's provision resembles the right recently given to Texas
corporations to have their liquidations carried out under court supervision. Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act arts. 6.06A(3), 7.06, 7.07 (1955).
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partnership property is at all times in the partners and limited to
partnership purposes.24 A deceased partner's rights in firm property
vest in the surviving partners.24 Thus the remaining partners' rights
to control property and settle affairs are independent of the exist-
ence of the debts, which have acquired an exaggerated importance
in Texas. The precise incidents of the right to wind up are not
detailed in the act, but there is nothing to suggest any constric-
tion of those already recognized in Texas cases. Indeed, the em-
phasis on cash payment of surplus to partners24 implies wide authori-
ty to convert other assets into money. On the other hand, the act
does not obstruct buy-and-sell agreements or other contractual var-
iances from the statutory pattern of winding up."'
A major innovation which the act would bring to Texas is an
option given the remaining partners to buy out a wrongfully dis-
solving partner instead of winding up and terminating. The part-
ners who have not wrongfully dissolved may (subject to certain
conditions, e.g., unanimity among them) continue the business
in the same name and possess the partnership property by paying or
securing to the wrongfully dissolving partner the value of his inter-
est at dissolution. Against this they may offset any damages to which
they are entitled for his breach of agreement."' The usefulness of
such a provision will depend on economic factors which the law can-
not hope to control, such as the ability of the remaining partners
to raise funds or obtain a bond."1
Some kinds of dissolution under the act (e.g., by supervening
illegality or court decree) terminate at once the authority of part-
ners to act for one another except as necessary to wind up affairs or
complete pending transactions." A partner who proceeds beyond
these bounds, regardless of his awareness of the fact of dissolution,
2" SS 8, 21 (2) (a).
247 25(2) (d).
39 8(1).
249Cf. In re Ilg's Estate, 348 Ill. App. 545, 109 N.E.2d 362 (1952).
2 5 38(2)(b). The partner is entitled to release from partnership liabilities. Good
will is not considered in valuing his interest. S 38(2)(c)(II). He may be entitled
to interest on the sum owed him or a share of profits. § 42. Both sections are con-
strued and applied in Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal. App. 2d 804, 291 P.2d 2f (1955).
2 Consider the case of Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
error ref. n.r.e., discussed notes 230-34 supra and accompanying text. If Lewis sought
to force Collins out on the theory that the latter had wrongfully dissolved, Lewis
would have either to find money to pay Collins off (which he had already tried and
failed to do) or to obtain a bond (which might well be unavailable or prohibitively
costly). In either event, he would have to deal with the bank which was a substantial
lender through Collins to the partnership and which (particularly in view of Collins'
close connection with it) might refuse to permit transfer of its obligation.
332S 33(1).
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cannot obtain contribution from his co-partners for his commit-
ments. However, a partner unaware of less notorious types of dis-
solution is protected. If dissolution is by a co-partner's act (e.g., ex-
pressing his will, rightfully or wrongfully), the partner may have
contribution for the liabilities he creates until he has knowledge of
the act. ' And if dissolution is by a co-partner's death or bankruptcy,
the partner may have contribution for the liabilities he creates un-
til he has knowledge or notice of these facts."5 '
2. Relations with Third Parties...
Dissolution effects no change in a partner's liability for existing
partnership obligations."" Novation may operate to relieve the part-
ner if there are appropriate dealings between the creditor and the
successor to the partnership." ' These rules are also found in the act
which is slightly more explicit as to novation,5 s and considerably
more detailed as to the rights of creditors when the partnership is
continued or reformed after a change in membership."9
A single Texas case... is the source of most of the Texas law on
third parties' rights growing out of post-dissolution transactions
with a partner. There is no problem, of course, if the transaction
is within the winding up authority of the partner who makes it;
253 34(a). Knowledge is defined by S 3(1) in terms of actual knowledge or
knowledge of such other facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith. Jones v.
Mitchell, 47 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref., may be in conflict with
the act. There was full awareness of dissolution at the time the assessments were
paid. The result of the case could be reached under the act only via S 33, i.e., holding
that the assessment was necessary to the winding up or to the completion of an un-
finished transaction. Either theory is doubtful. An alternative might be the argument
that the partnership had not really been dissolved inasmuch as the assessments and
perhaps other activities continued more than two years after the agreed dissolution
date. Cf. Brammer v. Wilder, 122 Tex. 247, 57 S.W.2d 571 (1933).
254§ 34(b). Notice is defined by 5 3(2) in terms of spoken or written state-
ments of the facts in question.
211 See also note 235 supra.
256 Shaw v. Green, 128 Tex. 596, 99 S.W.2d 889 (1937) (assessment on bank
stock owned by partnership before dissolution); Reed v. Shaw, 274 S.W. 274 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) (partnership note).
211 Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Poulous, 8 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (jury found
creditor intended to release old partners when, knowing of dissoluton, he accepted re-
newal note from new partners).
25sS 36.
25n 41. See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
2 6
0Thompson v. Harmon, 207 S.W. 909 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919). See also Hunt
Oil Co. v. Killion, 299 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e., holding
a partner not liable for obligations incurred in the partnership name after he sold his
interest. Apparently he gave adequate notice; in any event, the plaintiffs admitted they
had knowledge or notice of the sale. Also interesting is the alternate holding of the same
case: a surety is not liable (on its bond issued to the partnership prior to the sale)
for any debts incurred after the sale; the bond covered only debts of the partnership
which was dissolved by the sale. The surety would be liable only because of estoppel
against itself. Estoppel against the ex-partner would make him liable, but not the
firm, hence not the surety.
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in this event all partners are bound. In other cases, third parties are
divided into three classes according to their pre-dissolution relations
with the partnership, and their rights are defined as follows in, terms
of the notice of dissolution they are entitled to receive:
(1) Persons who actually dealt with the partnership before dis-
solution are entitled to actual notice of dissolution. If it is not given
to them, they may hold all the partners liable for post-dissolution
transactions of any one of the partners. In all events, of course,
they may enforce pre-dissolution obligations against any of the part-
ners.
(2) Persons who did not deal with the partnership before dis-
solution but had knowledge (actual, not just by general reputation)
of its existence are entitled to constructive notice (i.e., by publica-
tion) of dissolution. If it is not given them, they may hold all the
partners liable for post-dissolution transactions with any one of the
partners.
(3) Persons with no pre-dissolution dealings or knowledge are
not entitled to any notice. They may recover only against the part-
ner with whom they had post-dissolution transactions.
It will be recognized that estoppel is the principle underlying
the Texas rules. It also underlies the provisions of the act which are
more elaborate and vary somewhat with the type of dissolution.
The act speaks in terms of binding the partnership (i.e., every part-
ner) after dissolution. In general, of course, winding up transactions
are binding because they are authorized,"6 ' and one who holds him-
self out as a partner after dissolution is as liable as if no dissolution
had occurred."' The partnership cannot be bound at all if the
dissolution is by supervening illegality or bankruptcy of a part-
ner. 63 In these circumstances no one is entitled to notice, regardless
of prior relations with the partnership. If dissolution is for any
other reason, the results may be classified according to the pre-dis-
solution relations of the third persons with the partnership."' This
classification is as follows:
(1) Persons who lent pre-dissolution credit to the partnership
are entitled to knowledge or notice of the dissolution. 6' If it is not
given to them, they may hold all the partners liable for post-dissolu-
...S 35(1)(a). But see 5 35(3).
"55 35(4), 16.
%83s 35(3)(a), (b).
'"This is not the primary criterion in the act, which classifies first by type of
transaction. The arrangement used here is to facilitate comparison with Texas law. As
in any paraphrase of a highly organized statute, there is some loss of precision.
"' Knowledge and notice are specially defined in 5 3.
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tion transactions of any one of the partners. ' This differs from
Texas essentially only in narrowing the protected class of third per-
sons from those with prior dealings to those who have previously
lent credit. This eliminates the notice requirement for cash customers
and suppliers whose names would probably not appear on the part-
nership records, and who could therefore not be easily notified.""7
The same result is obtained under the act if the partner is acting
without authority (e.g., because he has wrongfully dissolved) and
the third person has no knowledge or notice of the lack of authori-
ty. " This makes it advisable for the notice of dissolution to state
which, if any, of the partners are without authority to wind up.
(2) Persons who did not lend pre-dissolution credit to the part-
nership but knew of the partnership before its dissolution are en-
titled to notice by publication."' This result also harmonizes with
Texas law. The act specifically states what the Texas courts would
undoubtedly hold if faced with the problem: that, despite failure
to give notice, a partner is not bound to one who actually knows
of dissolution." An analogous result will be had if the partner is
acting without authority and the third person has no knowledge or
notice of the lack of authority and the same has not been publish-
ed." '7 Thus, the published notice of dissolution, like the actual notice
to prior creditors, should identify any partners not authorized to
participate in the winding up.
(3) Other third persons are not entitled to any notice. Texas is
in accord.
3. Distribution of Assets
The most difficult and complex problems of dissolution are
those attendant on the distribution of assets. At issue are the
relations of partners to each other and to their creditors. Specifi-
cally, these questions must be answered: what are the assets
of the partnership; what priorities are to be observed; are contri-
butions from the partners to pay liabilities necessary, and in what
amounts; who may enforce the right to contributions, and what
property may be levied upon. Section 40 of the act offers a precise
266 S 35(1) (b) (I). Section 35(2) limits the liability of inactive and unknown part-
ners in this situation.
" Commissioners' Note to S 35.
'"5 35(3)(c)(I).
669 3 (1) (b) (II). This contains details of the method of publication. Section 3 5 (2),
limiting the liability of an inactive partner, is applicable here, too.
2" Ibid.271 S 3 5(3) (c) (HI).
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formulation of workable rules which would solve many of the pro-
blems left unsolved by the Texas cases."' Texas courts have too often
confused the law by their generous use of equity principles.
Section 40 has nine subsections, which may be categorized into
four groupings: (1) subsection (a) defines the partnership assets;(2) subsection (b) prescribes the order of payment of liabilities,
and subsection (c) gives the order in which assets shall be used
to pay the liabilities; (3) subsections (d)-(g) declare rules for
contribution from the partners; (4) subsections (h) and (i)
prescribe priorities in insolvency situations. Section 40 will be dis-
cussed according to this division.
a. Partnership Assets.- Assets under section 40 consist of more
than the physical property and choses-in-action which the firm may
possess on dissolution; they include contributions of the partners
which may be required to dispose of liabilities for debts and capital.
This is an important concept and a distinct addition to Texas law,
since the authors have found no cases dealing with the problem."'
The rule assumes importance only when the partnership is insolvent;
when the firm is solvent at time of dissolution the ordinary firm
assets suffice to pay partnership debts (including capital) and no
contributions are required."4 The assets are Valued as of the date
of dissolution both under the act... and under Texas law.7" Antici-
patory profits may not be considered as a firm asset unless they
are fairly certain; speculative profits are excluded both by the act
and Texas courts.77 Under the act, the partners may of course pro-
vide in the partnership agreement that assets shall be valued accord-
ing to the books at time of dissolution,"'8 or an arbitrary value may
2172 Section 40 is not a cure-all, however. For instance, the act nowhere indicates
a method by which complicated accounting problems may be simplified, probably be-
cause there is no practical way to do so. The accounting is often formidable when apartnership is dissolved, particularly if the assets and liabilities are considerable or the
firm is insolvent. For an illustration of accounting under § 40, see Comment, 23
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 331 (1951).
.. Texas of course recognizes a partner's right to seek contribution from his co-partners when he has paid partnership debts, see notes 283-88 infra and accompanying
text, but this right of an individual partner is not recognized as a firm asset. The act is
a recognition of the "entity" theory of partnership; i.e., a partner is a contributor to
the partnership. Since debts paid by an individual partner are an advancement, and
since advancements must be shared like other losses under § 18 (a), the partner's right to
get his money returned is unchanged (in all probability) by the act.
274 A more complete explanation of S 40(a) and its significance is in notes 283-88
infra and accompanying text.275Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. St. 369, 131 Atl. 276 (1925).
76 Vogt v. Lee, 32 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (semble).
277 Murray v. Bateman, 315 Mass. 113, 51 N.E.2d 954 (1943); Gillean v. Bennett,
Tarlton & Co., 264 S.W. 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).17 Smith v. Smith, 307 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1957); In re Witkino's Estate, 167 Misc.
881, 4 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1938).
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be put upon a partner's interest by an option agreement."' Texas
follows the proposition that final accounting and distribution shall
be in accordance with the partnership agreement and books.28'
b. Priority of Liabilities.-Section 40 (b), prescribing how liabili-
ties shall rank in order of payment, adds little to existing Texas law.
The act gives preference to partnership debts, which is not remark-
able, and then provides that liabilities to partners rank second. After
these classes of debts are paid, the partners are entitled to a return
of their capital, and the balance remaining, if any, is distributed
as profits. Texas is in accord with all of these propositions, 1  and
the adoption of section 40(b) would be no more than a convenient
clarification. The real problem in insolvency cases is usually in de-
termining whether money which an individual partner has "con-
tributed" to the partnership was intended to be an advancement or
loan (entitling him to preference over the other partners in assets
remaining after the debts are paid), or an addition to his capital
account.12
Section 40(c) logically provides that the partnership property
shall be exhausted before the contributions of the partners are used
to pay firm liabilities.
c. Contributions.-It is in subsections (d)-(g) that the act offers
some of its most constructive legislation. Briefly, they may be sum-
marized as follows.2 3 Section 40(d) places an affirmative duty on a
partner to contribute his share of the liabilities as provided for by
section 18 (a) ; if any partner is insolvent at the time of dissolution,
or refuses to pay and is not subject to process, the other partners
must contribute a pro rata share of his liability. Section 40 (e) per-
mits an assignee for the benefit of creditors (or any court appointee)
to enforce the contributions of section 40(d), and section 40(f)
permits a partner to enforce the contribution which another part-
279 Black v. Mylish, 351 Pa. 611, 41 A.2d 731 (1943).28
°Peters v. Brookshire, 143 Tex, 21, 182 S.W.2d 361 (1944).
"'Partnership debts must be paid first. Smith v. Wayman, 148 Tex. 318, 224
S.W.2d 211 (1949). A partner who has made advancements other than as a capital
contribution is a creditor as to the other partners, Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m., thus making him a "secondary" creditor,
ranking after third-party partnership creditors. After these two classes of debts are
paid, each partner is entitled to his actual capital contribution, or a proportionate part
of the remaining capital, Johnston v. Ballard, 83 Tex. 486, 18 S.W. 686 (1892); evidence
of unequal capital contributions is sufficient to show that the capital is not to be
divided equally on dissolution. Ibid. After capital is repaid, any balance remaining
is divided among the partners as profits. Newman v. Newman, 195 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946), aff'd, 145 Tex. 433, 198 S.W.2d 91 (1947); cf. Diamond v. Gust,
206 S.W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) error ref. (semble).282 Cf. Paggi v. Quinn, supra note 281.
"' For full text see Appendix.
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ner has not paid, to the extent of his excess payment under sub-
section (d). Subsection (g) makes a deceased partner's estate liable
for his contributions.
Since section 18(a) has already been examined,"s' the first clause
of subsection (d) will not be discussed further. The second clause
of the subsection is worthy of some consideration, even though on its
face it is but a recognition of the well-established principle that
partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership debts."s As
was noted above, the right to contribution includes partners' con-
tributions for capital losses, which are in proportion to each part-
ner's share of the profits. This second clause, then, would in the
cases of a partner's insolvency or immunity from process force the
other partners to share a greater portion of the capital losses. The
situation would be novel in Texas jurisprudence; from existing
case law it is probable that such a result would not now be reached, s6
fair though it may be. The impact of this clause obviously would
be greatest on intra-partnership relations.
Creditors' rights in partnership property have already been dis-
cussed, s7 and no further effort will be made in that direction in
connection with section 40 (e). This subsection and subsections (f)
and (g) merely grant procedural dispensations enabling interested
parties to enforce rights previously created." s
d. Priorities of Creditors Where Partnership InsolventS.2 -The
act incorporates into section 40(h) the prevailing rule that
partnership creditors have priority in partnership property and
separate creditors in individual property. This section, along with
section 40(i), which decrees that separate creditors of a partner
are preferred over partnership creditors, would materially change
existing Texas law; our courts hold that "the holder of a claim
284 For a discussion of § 18(a), see text following note 146 supra.
2.. Texas has recognized this principle from earliest days. See, e.g., Smith v. Wayman,
148 Tex. 318, 224 S.W.2d 211 (1949); Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 665, 26 S.W.
939 (1894).
... This conclusion is reached not because of any particular case, but because of the
general confusion in the cases concerning capital losses. See text following note 117
supra, discussing the Texas cases dealing with capital losses. See particularly Brad-
ford v. Bradford, 172 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), where the court
approved this statement: "The law will not imply a promise by a copartner to repay
advancements of capital during the continuance or at the dissolution of the partnership."
287 See note 68 supra and followng text.
.. No case has been found in which a Texas assignee for the benefit of creditors
sought to enforce a partner's right to contributions, although partners have frequently
sought contributions. See e.g., Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. A partner's individual property would certainly be liable for his contribution.
Ibid.
.a For a discussion of related material see note 214 supra.
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against a partnership can establish a claim against the estate of a
deceased partner, and share equally and pro rata with separate credi-
tors.29 Whether or not this change is desirable,29' it would of course
bring Texas in line with the rule in the great majority of states.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Partnerships, nearly a million of them, are the commonest form of
business association in the United States.292 Texas undoubtedly has
the largest number of these not subject to any comprehensive corpus
of substantive law. Texas courts have, of course, decided the many
cases brought before them. But it is no insult to the courts that they
have produced some highly individual results and that the totality
of their decisions is in some respects incoherent and in others in-
complete; this is the nature of the common law. Our Article has
reviewed the cases, demonstrated their defects, and described the
cures offered by the Uniform Partnership Act.
The act is a rational distillation of the common law. It is there-
fore no surprise to find that the act generally harmonizes with
Texas cases. Where it differs, it offers improvements. Its uniformity
is no mere promise, for it has been adopted in thirty-seven jurisdic-
tions. This in itself is a virtue where interstate enterprise and owner-
ship prevail. It also means that the act has been thoroughly tested and
found workable.
The major improvements which the act would accomplish in Texas
are:
(1) Authorizing partnerships to hold and convey title to realty;
(2) Allowing individual creditors to charge or take assignments
of a partner's interest without a dissolution, thus protecting the co-
partners;
(3) Eliminating confusion as to the causes and consequences of
dissolution, e.g., by assuring remaining partners the right to wind
up, allowing innocent partners the right to buy the interest of a
wrongfully dissolving partner, and limiting the notice necessary to
prevent the incurring of new liabilities after dissolution;
29Webb v. Gregory, 108 S.W. 478, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); see also Higgins
v. Rector, 47 Tex. 361 (1877).
... Professor Crane states that the traditional rule is "logically indefensible," since
it deprives the partnership creditor of his legal rights against the separate property
at the time he needs most to exercise them. Crane, Partnership S 94 (2d ed. 1912).
292 In 1953, the latest year for which figures are available, 958,591 partnerships,
compared to 697,975 corporations, filed federal income tax returns. U. S. Treasury Dep't,
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income for 1953, Partnership Returns 49 (1957)
and Corporation Income Tax Returns 27 (1956).
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(4) Preserving the rights of partnership creditors despite a change
in members of the firm;
(5) Altering the nature of partnership property in order to
preserve prior rights of partnership creditors, e.g., by freeing them
from the subrogation of their priority to the partners and of part-
ners (e.g., by preventing a partner from assigning individually his
interest in partnership property) ;
(6) Specifying that the right of contribution is a partnership
asset, prescribing in detail the order of priority for distribution of
partnership assets.
Among the many lesser improvements of the act are:
(1) Confirming that a corporation may be a partner;...
(2) Formalizing the mutual agency relationships of partners; 2 4
(3) Permitting an accounting in appropriate instances without
dissolution;
(4) Systematizing relations among partners (without removing
their right to provide otherwise by contract), e.g., by requiring
all losses (including capital losses) to be shared, by extending
fiduciary relations, and by eliminating implied agreements for spe-
cial compensation.
The Uniform Partnership Act goes far toward curing the numer-
ous defects in Texas law. Moreover, the act contains a careful,
coherent, and comprehensive body of partnership principles which
Texas sadly needs.
293 2 (defining "person" to include corporations) and § 6 (defining "partnership"
as an association of two or more persons). The purport of Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. art.
2.02A(7) (1955) may be the same, but its efficacy has not yet been established.
21 § 9. This has not been discussed in the Article since it would not make im-
portant changes. Its primary contribution would be to eliminate the unfortunate and
artificial limitation on the authority of "non-trading" partners. See Randall v. Meredith,





PART I - PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
§ 1. Name of Act.-This act may be cited as Uniform Partnership Act.
§ 2. Definition of Terms.-In this act, "Court" includes every court and
judge having jurisdiction in the case.
"Business" includes every trade, occupation, or profession.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and other asso-
ciations.
"Bankrupt" includes bankrupt under the Federal Bankruptcy Act or in-
solvent under any state insolvent act.
"Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease, mortgage, or encum-
brance.
"Real property" includes land and any interest or estate in land.
§ 3. Interpretation of Knowledge and Notice.- (1) A person has "knowl-
edge" of a fact within the meaning of this act not only when he has ac-
tual knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such other facts
as in the circumstances shows bad faith.
(2) A person has "notice" of a fact within the meaning of this act
when the person who claims the benefit of the notice:
(a) States the fact to such person, or
(b) Delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication,
a written statement of the fact to such person or to a proper person at
his place of business or residence.
§ 4. Rules of Construction.- (1) The rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to
this act.
(2) The law of estoppel shall apply under this act.
(3) The law of agency shall apply under this act.
(4) This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effect its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(5) This act shall not be construed so as to impair the obligations of
any contract existing when the act goes into effect, nor to affect any action
or proceedings begun or right accrued before this act takes effect.
§ 5. Rules for Cases Not Provided for in This Act.-In any case not
provided for in this act the rules of law and equity, including the law mer-
chant, shall govern.
PART II-NATURE OF A PARTNERSHIP
§ 6. Partnership Defined.-(1) A partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.
(2) But any association formed under any other statute of this state,
or any statute adopted by authority, other than the authority of this state,
is not a partnership under this act, unless such association would have been
a partnership in this state prior to the adoption of this act; but this act shall
apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the statutes relating to
1958]
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such partnerships are inconsistent herewith.
§ 7. Rules for Determining the Existence of a Partnership.-In deter-
mining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by section 16 persons who are not partners as
to each other are not partners as to third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made
by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partner-
ship, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right
or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such in-
ference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord,
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner,
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with
the profits of the business,
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a good-will of a business
or other property by installments or otherwise.
§ 8. Partnership Property.- (1) All property originally brought into
the partnership stock or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise,
on account of the partnership, is partnership property.
(2) Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with part-
nership funds is partnership property.
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership
name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
(4) A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though
without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor unless
a contrary intent appears.
PART III - RELATIONS OF PARTNERS TO PERSONS DEALING
WITH THE PARTNERSHIP
S 9. Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership Business.-(l) Every
partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and
the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name
of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business
of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless
the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership
in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowl-
edge of the fact that he has no such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on
of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the part-
nership unless authorized by the other partners.
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have aban-




(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the
assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on
the ordinary business of a partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority
shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
§ 10. Conveyance of Real Property of the Partnership.- (1) Where title
to real property is in the partnership name, any partner may convey title
to such property by a conveyance executed in the partnership name; but
the partnership may recover such property unless the partner's act binds
the partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 9, or un-
less such property has been conveyed by the grantee or a person claiming
through such grantee to a holder for value without knowledge that the
partner, in making the conveyance, has exceeded his authority.
(2) Where title to real property is in the name of the partnership, a
conveyance executed by a partner, in his own name, passes the equitable
interest of the partnership, provided the act is one within the authority of
the partner under the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 9.
(3) Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but not
all the partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the partner-
ship, the partners in whose name the title stands may convey title to such
property, but the partnership may recover such property if the partners'
act does not bind the partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1) of
section 9, unless the purchaser or his assignee, is a holder for value, without
knowledge.
(4) Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more or
all the partners, or in a third person in trust for the partnership, a con-
veyance executed by a partner in the partnership name, or in his own
name, passes the equitable interest of the parthership, provided the act is
one within the authority of the partner under the provisions of paragraph
(1) of section 9.
(5) Where the title to real property is in the names of all the partners
a conveyance executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such
property.
§ 11. Partnership Bound by Admission of Partner.-An admission or
representation made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within
the scope of his authority as conferred by this act is evidence against the
partnership.
§ 12. Partnership Charged with Knowledge of or Notice to Partner.-
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the
knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while
a partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other
partner who reasonably could and should have communicated it to the
acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, ex-
cept in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the
consent of that partner.
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§ 13. Partnership Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act.-Where, by any
wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners,
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partner-
ship, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the
same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
§ 14. Partnership Bound by Partner's Breach of Trust.-The partnership
is bound to make good the loss:
(a) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent author-
ity receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(b) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money
or property of a third person and the money or property so received is
misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership.
§ 15. Nature of Partner's Liability.-All partners are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partner-
ship under sections 13 and 14.
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership;
but any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a part-
nership contract.
§ 16. Partner by Estoppel.-(1) When a person, by words spoken or
written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another represent-
ing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or
more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person to whom
such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such repre-
sentation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if he has
made such representation or consented to its being made in a public man-
ner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not
been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with
the knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or con-
senting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he
were an actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as
to incur liability, otherwise separately.
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an ex-
isting partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is
an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to
the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where all
the members of the existing partnership consent to the representation, a
partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the
representation.
§ 17. Liability of Incoming Partner.-A person admitted as a partner
into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partner-
ship arising before his admission as though he had been a partner when such




PART IV-RELATIONS OF PARTNERS TO ONE ANOTHER
§18. Rules Determining Rights and Duties of Partners.-The rights and
duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, sub-
ject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(a) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way
of capital or advances to the partnership property and share equally in
the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to
partners, are satisfied; and must contribute toward the losses, whether
of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his
share in the profits.
(b) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of pay-
ments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of
its business or property.
(c) A partner, who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute,
shall be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance.
(d) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by
him only from the date when repayment should be made.
(e) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business.
(f) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partner-
ship business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable
compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.
(g) No person can become a member of a partnership without the
consent of all the partners.
(h) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but
no act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be
done rightfully without the consent of all the partners.
§ 19. Partnership Books.-The partnership books shall be kept, subject to
any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of business of
the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access to and may
inspect and copy any of them.
§ 20. Duty of Partners to Render Information.-Partners shall render on
demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to
any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner
under legal disability.
§ 21. Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary.-(1) Every partner must ac-
count to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
(2) This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased part-
ner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the per-
sonal representatives of the last surviving partner.
§ 22. Right to an Account.-Any partner shall have the right to a for-
mal account as to partnership affairs:
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(a) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or
possession of its property by his co-partners,
(b) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement,
(c) As provided by section 21,
(d) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
§ 23. Continuation of Partnership Beyond Fixed Term.- (1) When a
partnership for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued after
the termination of such term or particular undertaking without any express
agreement, the rights and duties of the partners remain the same as they
were at such termination, so far as is consistent with a partnership at will.
(2) A continuation of the business by the partners or such of them as
habitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liquida-
tion of the partnership affairs, is prima facie evidence of a continuation of
the partnership.
PART V - PROPERTY RIGHTS OF A PARTNER
§ 24. Extent of Property Rights of a Partner.-The property rights of
a partner are (1) his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his in-
terest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate in the manage-
ment.
§ 25. Nature of a Partner's Right in Specific Partnership Property.-
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property
holding as a tenant in partnership.
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this act and to any agree-
ment between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess
specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no
right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent
of his partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable
except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in
the same property.
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject
to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership.
When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt the part-
ners, or any of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, can-
not claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership pro-
perty vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the de-
ceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property
vests in his legal representative. Such surviving partner or partners, or
the legal representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to
possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject
to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin.
§ 26. Nature of Partner's Interest in the Partnership.-A partner's in-




§ 27. Assignment of Partner's Interest.- (1) A conveyance by a partner
of his interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership,
nor, as against the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the
assignee, during the continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the
management or administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to
require any information or account of partnership transactions, or to in-
spect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in
accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner
would otherwise be entitled.
(2) In case of a dissolution of the partnership, the assignee is entitled
to receive his assignor's interest and may require an account from the date
only of the last account agreed to by all the partners.
§ 28. Partner's Interest Subject to Charging Order.- (1) On due ap-
plication to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner, the
court which entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court,
may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the un-
satisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other
money due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and make
all other orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner
might have made, or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclos-
ure, or in case of a sale being directed by the court may be purchased with-
out thereby causing a dissolution:
(a) With separate property, by any one or more of the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more of the partners
with the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged
or sold.
(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner of his right,
if any, under the exemption laws, as regards his interest in the partnership.
PART VI- DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP
§ 29. Dissolution Defined.-The dissolution of a partnership is the
change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be
associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.
§ 30. Partnership Not Terminated by Dissolution.-On dissolution the
partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of part-
nership affairs is completed.§ 31. Causes of Dissolution.-Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners,
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking
specified in the agreement,
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or parti-
cular undertaking is specified,
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned
their interests or suffered them to be charged for their separate debts,
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either before or after the termination of any specified term or particular
undertaking,
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in
accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between the
partners;
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the
circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this
section, by the express will of any partner at any time;
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the part-
nership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership;
(4) By the death of any partner;
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership;
(6) By decree of court under section 32.
§ 32. Dissolution by Decree of Court.-(1) On application by or for a
partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding
or is shown to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing
his part of the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect
prejudicially the carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the part-
nership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating
to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest under
sections 27 and 28:
(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular under-
taking,
(b) At any time if the partnership was a partnership at will when
the interest was assigned or when the charging order was issued.
§ 33. General Effect of Dissolution on Authority of Partner.-Except
so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete
transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority
of any partner to act for the partnership,
(1) With respect to the partners,
(a) When the dissolution is not by the act, bankruptcy or death of
a partner; or
(b) When the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy or death of a
partner, in cases where section 34 so requires.
(2) With respect to persons not partners, as declared in section 35.
§ 34. Right of Partner to Contribution from Co-partners after Dissolu-
tion.-Where the dissolution is caused by the act, death or bankruptcy of
a partner, each partner is liable to his co-partners for his share of any
liability created by any partner acting for the partnership as if the partner-
ship had not been dissolved unless
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(a) The dissolution being by act of any partner, the partner acting
for the partnership had knowledge of the dissolution, or
(b) The dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy of a partner,
the partner acting for the partnership had knowledge or notice of the
death or bankruptcy.
§ 35. Power of Partner to Bind Partnership to Third Persons after Dis-
solution.-(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership except
as provided in Paragraph (3).
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or com-
pleting transactions unfinished at dissolution;
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolu-
tion had not taken place, provided the other party to the transaction
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and
had no knowledge or notice of his want of authority; or
(II) Though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known
of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or no-
tice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in a
newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in each place if more
than one) at which the partnership business was regularly carried on.
(2) The liability of a partner under Paragraph (1b) shall be satisfied
out of partnership assets alone when such partner had been prior to dis-
solution
(a) Unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is
made; and
(b) So far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs that the busi-
ness reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in any
degree due to his connection with it.
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of a partner after
dissolution
(a) Where the partnership is dissolved because it is unlawful to carry
on the business, unless the act is appropriate for winding up partnership
affairs; or
(b) Where the partner has become bankrupt; or
(c) Where the partner has no authority to wind up partnership affairs;
except by a transaction with one who
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution
and had no knowledge or notice of his want of authority; or
(II) Had not extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolu-
tion, and, having no knowledge or notice of his want of authority, the
fact of his want of authority has not been advertised in the manner pro-
vided for advertising the fact of dissolution in Paragraph (1bII).
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability under section 16 of
any person who after dissolution represents himself or consents to another
representing him as a partner in a partnership engaged in carrying on busi-
ness.
§ 36. Effect of Dissolution on Partner's Existing Liability.-(1) The
dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liabil-
ity of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution
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of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the part-
nership creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and
such agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the
creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership
continuing the business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dis-
solved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall
be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who,
knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or
time of payment of such obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for all
obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner but subject
to the prior payment of his separate debts.
§ 37. Right to Wind Up.-Unless otherwise agreed the partners who have
not wrongfully dissolved the partnership or the legal representative of the
last surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partner-
ship affairs; provided, however, that any partner, his legal representative or
his assignee, upon cause shown, may obtain winding up by the court.
§ 38. Rights of Partners to Application of Partnership Property.- (1)
When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the
partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners and all per-
sons claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership,
unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to dis-
charge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount
owing to the respective partners. But if dissolution is caused by expulsion
of a partner, bona fide under the partnership agreement and if the expelled
partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities, either by payment or
agreement under section 36(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount
due him from the partnership.
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership
agreement the rights of the partners shall be as follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have,
(I) All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section, and
(II) The right, as against each partner who has caused the dissolu-
tion wrongfully, to damages for breach of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if
they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by them-
selves or jointly with others, may do so, during the agreed term for the
partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership property,
provided they secure the payment by bond approved by the court, or pay
to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully, the value of
his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any damages recov-
erable under clause (2al) of this section, and in like manner indemnify
him against all present or future partnership liabilities.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
(I) If the business is not continued under the provisions of para-
graph (2b) all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1), subject to
clause (2alI), of this section,
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(II) If the business is continued under paragraph (2b) of this
section the right as against his co-partners and all claiming through them
in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have the value of his
interest in the parnership, less any damages caused to his co-partners by
the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in cash, or the payment se-
cured by bond approved by the court, and to be released from all existing
liabilities of the partnership; but in ascertaining the value of the partner's
interest the value of the good-will of the business shall not be considered.
§ 39. Rights Where Partnership is Dissolved for Fraud or Misrepresenta-
tion.-Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud
or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to re-
scind is, without prejudice to any other right, entitled,
(a) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partner-
ship property after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons
for any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in
the partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and
(b) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied,
in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made
by him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and
(c) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making
the representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
§ 40. Rules for Distribution.-In settling accounts between the partners
after dissolution, the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agree-
ment to the contrary:
(a) The assets of the partnership are:
(I) The partnership property,
(II) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment
of all the liabilities specified in clause (b) of this paragraph.
(b) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment,
as follows:
(I) Those owing to creditors other than partners,
(II) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits,
(III) Those owing to partners in respect of capital,
(IV) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(c) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in
clause (a) of this paragraph to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(d) The partners shall contribute, as provided by section 18(a) the
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contri-
bute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and,
in the relative proportions in which they share the profits, the additional
amount necessary to pay the liabilities.
(e) An assignee for the benefit of creditors or any person appointed
by the court shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified
in clause (d) of this paragraph.
(f) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to en-
force the contributions specified in clause (d) of this paragraph, to the




(g) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for
the contributions specified in clause (d) of this paragraph.
(h) When partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are in possession of a court for distribution, partnership creditors
shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on in-
dividual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as here-
tofore.
(i) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent
the claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order:
(I) Those owing to separate creditors,
(II) Those owing to partnership creditors,
(III) Those owing to partners by way of contribution.5 41. Liability of Persons Continuing the Business in Certain Cases.-
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or
when any partner retires and assigns (or the representative of the deceased
partner assigns) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the
partners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons,
if the business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs,
creditors of the first or dissolved partnership are also creditors of the part-
nership so continuing the business.
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representative of a
deceased partner assigns) their rights in partnership property to the remain-
ing partner, who continues the business without liquidation of partnership
affairs, either alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership
are also creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the business.
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved
partnership is continued as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
section, with the consent of the retired partners or the representative of
the deceased partner, but without any assignment of his right in partnership
property, rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and of the creditors
of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be as if such as-
signment had been made.
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their rights
in partnership property to one or more third persons who promise to pay
the debts and who continue the business of the dissolved partnership, cre-
ditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or part-
nership continuing the business.
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and the remain-
ing partners continue the business under the provisions of section 38 (2b),
either alone or with others, and without liquidation of the partnership af-
fairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person
or partnership continuing the business.
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners continue the
business either alone or with others, without liquidation of the partnership
affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the per-
son or partnership continuing the business.
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the partnership
continuing the business, under this section, to the creditors of the dissolved
partnership shall be satisfied out of partnership property only.
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(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued
under any conditions set forth in this section the creditors of the dissolved
partnership, as against the separate creditors of the retiring or deceased
partner or the representative of the deceased partner, have a prior right to
any claim of the retired partner or the representative of the deceased part-
ner against the person or partnership continuing the business, on account
of the retired or deceased partner's interest in the dissolved partnership or
on account of any consideration promised for such interest or for his right
in partnership property.
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right of creditors
to set aside any assignment on the ground of fraud.
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of
the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof,
shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner li-
able for any debts contracted by such person or partnership.
§ 42. Rights of Retiring or Estate of Deceased Partner When the Business
is Continued.-When any partner retires or dies, and the business is con-
tinued under any of the conditions set forth in section 41(1, 2, 3, 5, 6),
or section 38 (2b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or
his estate and the person or partnership continuing the business, unless
otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative as against such persons or
partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to
the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at
his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu of interest,
the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the dis-
solved partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved partnership
as against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or de-
ceased partner, shall have priority on any claim arising under this section,
as provided by section 41 (8) of this act.
§ 43. Accrual of Actions.-The right to an account of his interest shall
accrue to any partner, or his legal representative, as against the winding up
partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing
the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to
the contrary.
PART VII -MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
§ 44. When Act Takes Effect.-This act shall take effect on the
day of ---------- -------------- one thousand nine hundred and
§ 45. Legislation Repealed.-All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with
this act are hereby repealed.
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